Volume 37

Issue 3

Article 5

1992

Characterization of Land Use Decisions: A Zone of Uncertainty
Marguerite N. Przybylski

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marguerite N. Przybylski, Characterization of Land Use Decisions: A Zone of Uncertainty, 37 Vill. L. Rev.
663 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Przybylski: Characterization of Land Use Decisions: A Zone of Uncertainty

1992]
CHARACTERIZATION OF LAND USE DECISIONS:
A ZONE OF UNCERTAINTY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................
BACKGROUND ............................................

A.

B.

C.

III.
IV.

Types of Official Immunity ..............................
1. Absolute Immunity ..................................
2. Qualified Immunity .................................
Historical Overview of Legislative Immunity and Section 1983
1. Speech and Debate Clause ...........................
2. Section 1983 Immunity .............................
a. Immunity of State Legislators ..................
b. Immunity of Municipalities ....................
c. Immunity of Regional and Local Officials Sued
in their Personal Capacities ....................
Characterizationof Land Use Decisions to Determine the
Applicability of Immunity Defenses ........................
1. The "Rule Enactment Standard": Altaire Builders, Inc.
v. Village of Horseheads ..........................
2. The "General Scope Standard": Ryan v. Burlington
County and Haskell v. Washington Township ......
3. The "Fact/Impact Standard": Stone's Auto Mart, Inc.
v. City of St. Paul ................................
4. The "Enact/FactStandard".- Moore v. Trippe .......
5. The "Legislative Fact Standard": Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish ......................................
6. The "Legislative Process Standard": Hansen v. Bennett

DIscussIoN OF ZAMSKY
ANALYSIS OF ZAMSKY

v.

v.

664
672
672
672
675
678
678
679
679
681
682
684
687
691
693
699
70 1
704

HANSELL .........................

707

HANSELL ...........................

714

A.

Expansion of the Ninth Circuit's CharacterizationStandard by
the M ajority ..........................................
B. Interpretation of the Ninth Circuit's CharacterizationStandard
by the Dissent .........................................
C. Zamsky v. Hansell Analyzed Under the "Traditional" Rule
Enactment Standard ...................................
V . CONCLUSION ...............................................

714
717
719

721

(663)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 5

664

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 37: p. 663

INTRODUCTION

Under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,' government officials
acting under color of state law may be held personally liable 2 for those
acts that deprive persons of their constitutional rights. 3 Section 1983
liability is a matter of concern in particular for state and local govern1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides,
in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. For an application of this statute to land use cases, see Robert H. Freilich,
The U.S. Supreme Court and Land Use: Antitrust and Civil Rights Liability for Local
Governments, in 2 LAND USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 771, 788-93 (1986) (ALI-ABA Course of

Study Materials).
2. For a discussion of the requirement that government officials be sued in
an individual capacity, see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege both
that his constitutional rights were violated and that the person who violated his
rights was acting under "color of law." CRAIG A. PETERSON & CLAIRE MCCARTHY, HANDLING ZONING AND LAND USE LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 126(A), at 531 (1982). Aggrieved landowners have usually brought § 1983 actions
against zoning officials on the basis of the Takings, Due Process (substantive and

procedural) and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. See
Kenneth B. Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to Recover Damagesfor Undue Interference
with the Use of Land, in 2 LAND USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN AND COMPENSATION, supra note 1, at 807-19 (analyzing
constitutional theories espoused in § 1983 actions).
With respect to a due process allegation, it must be noted that land use
cases are more frequently brought on substantive due process or "takings"
grounds and less frequently on procedural due process grounds. PETERSON &
MCCARTHY, supra, § 12-7, at 550. Substantive due process under the Constitution places limits on state police power, requiring that land use regulation serve
public health, safety, morals and general welfare. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND
USE LAw § 2.31, at 36-37 (1982). Courts sometimes overlap substantive due
process analysis with takings and equal protection analyses. Id. § 2.31, at 37.
Procedural due process requires that government agencies provide procedures
through which the agencies make their decisions. Id. § 2.34, at 39. This requirement is imposed only on administrative as opposed to legislative zoning decisions. Id. Therefore, to determine whether a plaintiff's procedural due process

claim is valid, a court must characterize the challenged zoning decision as being
either administrative or legislative. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1427, 1508 (1978) [hereinafter Zoning]. This characterization process is
similar to the characterization process undertaken by courts to determine
§ 1983 immunity for local government officials. In fact, federal courts deciding
immunity issues have relied upon the characterization methods used by courts
that address procedural due process issues. See, e.g., Cutting v. Muzzey, 724
F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1984) (applying characterization tests that examine what
type of facts decision is based upon and impact of decision on individuals, as
suggested in Zoning, supra, at 1510-11); Three Rivers Cablevision v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118, 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (applying characterization stan-
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ment officials involved in land use planning. 4 Because state governdard articulated in Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981)).
4. Section 1983 actions brought against local government officials in their
individual capacities are used increasingly in land use disputes to remedy constitutional violations by local governments. FRANK SCHNIDMAN ET AL., HANDLING
THE LAND USE CASE 404 (1984). See generally Michael M. Berger, The Civil Rights
Act: An Alternative Remedy for Property Owners Which Avoids Some of the Procedural
Traps and Pitfalls in Traditional"Takings" Litigation, in 1990 ZONING AND PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK 291-304 (Mark S. Dennison ed., 1990). Berger argues that
§ 1983 litigation for land use disputes is on the rise for three primary reasons:
(1) all federal precedent applies to § 1983 litigation, whether land use cases or
not; (2) many procedural "hurdles" present in conventional takings cases are
not present in § 1983 cases; and (3) successful property owners may recover
attorneys' fees, which is favorable because "[r]egulatory taking litigation is expensive." Id. One of the hurdles in takings claims is the requirement that a
takings case be "ripe" before federal court litigation may commence. Id. at 295
(citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985)). A case is ripe when an aggrieved landowner seeks and is refused compensation in state courts. Id. Berger argues that the ripeness hurdle
is not present in § 1983 land use cases where the basis for the claim is a violation
of substantive due process. Id. at 296. This is because "[u]nlike an unconstitutional taking, which is not complete ...until the state has refused compensation,
a substantive due process violation is complete at the time of the original government action." Id. Furthermore, if the plaintiff makes a proper § 1983 claim
based on a substantive due process violation in a federal court, the plaintiff may
be able to "append an 'unripe' takings claim" to his federal claim through pendent jurisdiction so that the entire case will be heard in one court. Id. at 296-97.
An article by Brian Blaesser, however, presents an argument essentially opposite to Berger's. Within the article, Blaesser asserts that if a property owner
fails to jump the procedural hurdles in a takings claim, the property owner's
related claims of substantive due process, procedural due process and equal
protection will also be dismissed. Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse
Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land
Use Cases, in 1990 ZONING AND PLANNING LAw HANDBOOK, supra, § 12.01, at 310-

11.
For a full discussion of the entire litigation process for § 1983 claims in land
use disputes, see PETERSON & MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12. Peterson and McCarthy include three sample "anatomies" from § 1983 land use cases. Id. at
591-663. The first anatomy is an example of an attack on an administrative decision and includes excerpts from a complaint filed by a developer, a memorandum in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss and a memorandum in
support of the defendant's motion to abstain. Id. at 591-611. The second anatomy describes a 1980 Third Circuit case involving down-zoning and includes
excerpts from the developer's cross-claim against the defendants for a declaratory judgment and the court's opinion. Id. at 613-33. The third anatomy describes a suit brought against a local government for including a landowner's
property in a local redevelopment plan allegedly in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 633-63. This third anatomy includes excerpts from a complaint (seeking an injunction, declaratory judgment and damages), the plaintiff's
first request to produce documents to the city and a memorandum in opposition
to defendants' motion to strike, dismiss and abstain. Id.
The procedural hurdle of ripeness, as well as the doctrine of abstention
mentioned below, arises out of issues relating to the appropriate circumstances
for judicial review. See Blaesser, supra, in 1990 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK, supra, § 12.01, at 307. Both doctrines in particular bar causes of action in
land use cases brought under § 1983. See generally id. § 12.01, at 307-08 (arguing
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ments authorize local governments through enabling legislation to
adopt the majority of land use laws, local government officials are especially likely to face section 1983 liability in the land use planning context. 5 Notwithstanding the threat of section 1983 liability against
government officials, whether local or state, government officials can invoke a number of defenses that may shield them from liability. 6 One
that applying doctrines of ripeness and abstention to stay or dismiss constitutional challenges to land use decisions allows only the "most egregious examples of arbitrary action by local governments" to be heard).
The ripeness doctrine requires that the local government's decision be sufficiently final and that the plaintiff property owner show that "he or she sought
and was denied 'just' compensation through the state's inverse condemnation
procedures, or that such procedures on their face are inadequate" or unavailable. Id. § 12.02, at 310-11. The abstention doctrine permits a district court, in
its discretion, to decline to adjudicate a case raising federal constitutional issues
on the basis that the federal constitutional problems can be eliminated by state
court resolution of state law questions. MANDELKER, supra note 3, § 8.35. There
are three types of abstention recognized by the United States Supreme Court:
Pullman abstention, Burford abstention and Younger abstention. Blaesser, supra, in
1990 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK, supra, § 12.02[1][b], at 317; see also
MANDELKER, supra note 3, § 8.36-8.38. Under Pullman abstention, a federal court
will decline jurisdiction if the state law issues raised in the federal suit are unsettled and touch upon a sensitive area of social policy; the federal court will accept
jurisdiction if there is no other avenue for adjudication except in the federal
court. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
Under Burford abstention, the federal court may refuse jurisdiction if it believes
that the cause of action would interfere with state efforts to formulate a coherent
policy and would result in conflicting interpretations of state law. Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943). Younger abstention dictates that a
federal court may not enjoin a state criminal prosecution instituted before the
federal action except in very unusual situations, such as where necessary to prevent irreparable injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
Some commentators have observed that federal courts are reluctant to review land use decisions and would rather have the state court decide such cases.
See, e.g., SCHNIDMAN, ET AL., supra, § 9.7.3, at 395. However, it is felt that recent
cases expanding the reach of § 1983 have "encouraged" federal courts to review
challenges to land use regulation. Id. § 9.7.3, at 396.
This Note will not address the governmental immunity issue in intergovernmental land use disputes. For a discussion of this area of law, see Laurie Reynolds, The Judicial Role in Intergovernmental Land Use Disputes: The Case Against
Balancing, 71 MINN. L. REV. 611 (1987) (discussing three traditional tests used by
courts to determine governmental immunity and examining balancing test);
MANDELKER, supra note 3, at § 4.29.
5. See MANDELKER, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 1 (stating that "[s]tate enabling
legislation authorizes local land use planning and control, and in some states
local governments adopt land use controls under their constitutional home rule
powers"). Mandelker also notes that "[a]ll states . . . have enabling legislation
authorizing localities to engage in a comprehensive planning process and adopt
comprehensive plans." Id. For a definition of "comprehensive plan," see infra
note 18.
6. PETERSON & MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 12-11 to 12-13. The authors
outline the following seven "defenses" that officials may assert to relieve them
from liability. First, if a plaintiff raises a procedural due process claim against a
government official, the official may show that an adequate state remedy exists,
thus fulfilling the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
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such defense is official immunity.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the function of the
government official rather than his or her status determines the availability of an immunity defense in a section 1983 action. 7 Generally, official

functions can be categorized as either legislative, executive or judicial. 8
Characterizing official acts according to their function is necessary not
only for determining whether defendant officials can invoke an immurights. Id. § 12-7. Second, if the municipality is being sued, it may assert a "respondeat superior exception" which prevents the municipality from being held
liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees/officials where the only relationship between the municipality and the officials is that of employer-employee.
Id. § 12-8. Third, if the state is being sued, the state may assert that it is protected by absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. Id. § 12-09. The Eleventh Amendment may also protect local government
entities which can clearly show that their land use acts are tied into statewide
standards with statewide supervision. Id. Fourth, if government officials are being sued for actions taken while performing a judicial function, they can raise the
defense of absolute judicial immunity against liability for damages. Id. § 12-11.
Fifth, if city attorneys are named as defendants, they can assert the defense of
absolute immunity for their prosecutorial activities. Id. § 12-12. Sixth, if government officials are being sued for actions performed in a legislative capacity,
they may assert an absolute immunity defense. Id. § 12-13. Finally, if governmental officials are being sued and are not afforded absolute immunity, they may
still be protected by qualified "good faith" immunity. Id. § 12-15.
Governmental officials are not the only individuals who can be sued under
§ 1983. Private persons who enter into a conspiracy with others acting under
color of state law may also be sued. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
931 (1982); see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) ("Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting
'under color' of law for purposes of § 1983 actions."). Interestingly, while governmental officials may be protected by absolute immunity, private individuals
will not be entitled to the same protection. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 31-32.
7. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (acknowledging that functional approach to immunity questions must be used so that "the nature of the
functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully
entrusted" is examined); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983) ("[O]ur
cases clearly indicate that immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not
on the status of the defendant."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810 (1982)
(applying "functional" approach to immunity law); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 512-13 (1978) (holding that persons performing adjudicatory functions are
absolutely immune from liability due to characteristics of judicial process and
not their government position).
8. See, e.g., Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 217 A.2d 578, 582 (Md.
1966) ("It is elementary that governmental bodies, tribunals, agencies, boards
...and officials, in the performance of their public duties, exercise functions
that are divided into three general categories: executive, judicial, and legislative."); see also Michael S. Holman, Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of
Judicialor Quasi-JudicialAction, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 134 (1972) [hereinafter Zoning Amendment] (stating that city councils, county commissioners, and township
trustees "perform not only legislative but also executive and judicial functions").
Government action can also be characterized as quasi-legislative or quasijudicial. See Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 482 (5th Cir.)
(quasi-legislative), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986);
Zoning Amendment, supra, at 142 (quasi-judicial).
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nity defense, but also for determining which kind of immunity applies:
absolute or qualified. Thus, if a court characterizes an act as legislative
or judicial in nature, it will grant absolute immunity and dismiss the
plaintiff's suit at the outset, without inquiring into the reasonableness of
the act. 9 On the other hand, if a court characterizes an act as administrative or executive in nature, it will grant qualified immunity and dismiss the suit, so long as the act passes the qualified immunity test.10
Characterization of an official act is crucial to the determination of
the applicable immunity.'" Ordinarily, zoning and land use control is
characterized as a legislative function. 12 For instance, circuit and district courts have determined that an official who enacts an ordinance is
clearly acting in a legislative capacity and will thus be entitled to absolute immunity.' 3 At times, however, it is difficult to characterize the acts
of officials because officials often assume a mixture of functions.' 4 In
9. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976) (stating that "abso-

lute immunity defeats a suit at the outset"); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Absolute immunity defeats a damage
suit at the pleading stage."); SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAw OF SECTION 1983 § 7.01, at 3 (3d ed. 1991) (stating
that objective reasonableness is not scrutinized to determine whether absolute
immunity applies). For the purposes of clarity in this Note, legislative and judicial immunity will be referred to as "absolute legislative immunity" and "absolute judicial immunity" respectively. For a more detailed discussion of absolute
immunity, see infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
10. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (holding that judge
may determine whether defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity during summary judgment motion); Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 611 ("[Qualified
immunity is available only if the evidence shows that [the officials'] actions were
taken in good faith, i.e., with a reasonable belief that they were lawful."). For a
discussion of qualified immunity, see infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
11. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988) (judicial functions re-

ceive absolute immunity whereas administrative decisions do not); Clulow v.
Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1298 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that characterizing
official function is first step in § 1983 immunity analysis).
12. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (stating that " '[i]f
the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgments must be allowed to control' " (quoting Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926))); cf Detz v. Hoover, 539
F. Supp. 532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (asserting that zoning and land use control,
"although generally considered legislative functions," can be considered administrative in "specifiable" circumstances).
13. NAHMOD, supra note 9, § 7.05, at 17-18. In addressing the characterization issue with respect to determining whether absolute immunity applies,
Nahmod stated that "[w]here clear legislative acts are involved, such as passing
of an ordinance, reducing the number of liquor licenses, or budget making, absolute immunity has been conferred." Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. See Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1290 (3d Cir. 1989) ("It
is generally understood that local governmental bodies ... are given a combination of proprietary, managerial and legislative powers."); Moore v. Trippe, 743
F. Supp. 201, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (recognizing that "with a local board it is
often difficult to differentiate executive action"); Stone's Auto Mart, Inc. v. City
of St. Paul, 721 F. Supp. 206, 209 (D. Minn. 1989) ("Unfortunately, it is often
difficult to determine whether government action concerning zoning is legisla-
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those cases where the function cannot be clearly identified, federal
courts have formulated their own characterization standards in the ab15
sence of guidance from the United States Supreme Court.
In Zamsky v. Hansell,'6 the Ninth Circuit addressed the characterizative or administrative."); Ward v. Village of Skokie, 186 N.E.2d 529, 533 (I11.
1962) (Kiingbiel, J., concurring specially); NAHMOD, supra note 9, § 7.05, at 19
(distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative acts of local legislators is
"sometimes especially difficult in land use cases"); Zoning Amendment, supra note
8, at 136 (stating that there is no distinct line distinguishing between legislative,
administrative or judicial acts). As concurring Justice Klingbiel stated in Ward v.
Village of Skokie:
Concededly it is difficult in zoning matters to formulate a precise
test separating legislative from administrative or quasi-judicial functions. For one thing the legislative function of laying down general
rules or regulating by district becomes less clear cut in its nature as the
size of the district or the number of people affected decreases.
Ward, 186 N.E.2d at 533.
In his Comment, author Michael Holman determined that legislative decisions are regulated by constitutional provisions, whereas judicial and executive
decisions are additionally limited by statutes and common law. Zoning Amendment, supra note 8, at 136. Holman focused on distinguishing between legislative
and judicial governmental zoning acts. Id. Holman formulated the following
test to distinguish between legislative and judicial acts:
Does the action formulate a general rule or policy which is applicable to
an open class of persons, interests, or situations, or does the action
apply a general rule or policy to specific persons, interests, or situations? If the answer is yes to the latter half of the question, then legislative action is present. If the answer is yes to the first half of the
question, then there is judicial action.
Id. at 136 n.59. Holman further argued that most zoning amendments "should
be considered the product of either judicial or quasi-judicial action." Id. at 13637.
15. NAHMOD, supra note 9, § 7.05, at 18-19; see e.g., Cinevision Corp. v. City
of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 579 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)
(rejecting approaches enunciated by other federal courts and instead adopting
"rule enactment" approach). In Cinevision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

rejected two possible methods of distinguishing between legislative and administrative acts, including the consideration of the scope of the official action and

the determination as to whether the official action consisted of voting. Id.For a

further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's treatment of Cinevision, see infra notes
257-58 and accompanying text and notes 277-78 and accompanying text.

The Zoning article evaluated three characterization tests used by state courts

to resolve procedural due process issues. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1509. Some
state courts consider the "nature of the decisionmaking body [to] determine[]
the character of the act." Id. Other courts "simply classify" certain types of
zoning decisions as legislative and others as administrative. Id. Still other

courts use an approach that "distinguishes general policy formulations, which

are considered legislative, from specific applications of previously formulated

policy, which are considered administrative." Id. In reviewing section 1983 im-

munity cases, this Note demonstrates that the federal courts utilize different
tests than the state tests analyzed in the Zoning article. For a discussion of what
methods federal courts have utilized, see infra notes 99-239 and accompanying
text.
16. 933 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 240-308 and accompanying text.
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tion issue in the land use context. The plaintiff in Zamsky brought a section 1983 action against the director of the state zoning body, the Land
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), and commissioners of the LCDC. 1 7 The commissioners had issued a continuance order
requiring the plaintiff's county to rezone the plaintiff's land so that the
county's comprehensive land use plan would be in conformity with the
state's land use goals.' 8 The plaintiff claimed that the order violated his
constitutional rights under the Due Process, Equal Protection and Takings Clauses of the United States Constitution. 9
In analyzing the immunity defenses raised by the defendants, the
Zamsky court characterized the defendants' act of issuing a continuance
order as executive in nature, primarily because the act involved monitoring the county's compliance with the state's land use goals. 20 The court
determined that such an act necessarily involved the "ad hoc decisionmaking" of an executive. 2 1 Thus, the court held that the officials could
not be afforded absolute immunity. 22 The court remanded the case for
further proceedings to determine whether the officials were entitled to
23
qualified immunity.
The majority in Zamsky utilized a characterization standard designed
to determine whether the defendant officials were formulating policy or
engaging in ad hoc decision-making. 24 The dissent, however, claimed
that the majority had in fact applied a characterization standard previously rejected by the Ninth Circuit that focused on the scope of the official act.

25

17. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 678.
18. Id.A "comprehensive plan" is a policy statement on land use planning

which directs the "use and development of property in the zoning territory." 82
AM.JUR. 2D Zoning § 69, at 502 (1976). The comprehensive plan is to be implemented by zoning regulations that have the force of law. Id. The enabling legislation in most states requires that zoning regulations comply with a
comprehensive plan. Id. at 501. The comprehensive plan requirement is "in-

tended to avoid an arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory use of power, and
to avoid lot-by-lot zoning." Id. at 502. When a comprehensive plan has been
prepared by the planning board, it is considered advisory and may be changed at
any time. Id. at 503.

19. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 678.
20. Id. at 679. The Zamsky court also noted that Zamsky's property was
"singled out" by the zoning ordinance; thus, enforcement of that ordinance constituted "an executive action subject only to qualified immunity." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 679-80.

23. Id. at 680. For a discussion of qualified immunity, see infra notes 55-67
and accompanying text.
24. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679. The court found that "[m]onitoring compliance with established laws . . .is an executive function involving 'ad-hoc decision-making' rather than 'formulation of policy' which is a legislative function.
Id. This method of characterization was previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit
in Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
25. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). The dissent further
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The majority and dissenting opinions in Zamsky exemplify two interpretations of one of six different characterization standards federal
26
courts have employed to evaluate the acts of government officials.
While these characterization standards overlap, they differ slightly in
their focus. For example, while one characterization standard is based
on whether the challenged official act reflected an enactment or enforcement of a law, 2 7 a different standard is concerned with whether the officials relied on legislative facts and whether their act impacted on specific
individuals. 28 Another standard combines both of these inquiries. 29
Other standards investigate such issues as the effect that a general law
has on the community, 30 whether the defendant officials acted on the
basis of legislative facts, 3 ' and whether the challenged official act was
32
part of the legislative process.
This Note first discusses the different types of immunity available to
government officials 33 and explores the history of absolute legislative
immunity. 34 This Note then outlines the present position of the federal

courts regarding immunity in section 1983 actions and specifically describes the standards used by the federal courts to characterize the land
use decisions of government officials. 35 Against this backdrop, this Note
presents the facts of Zamsky v. Hansell, followed by an analysis of the
court's decision. 3 6 In the final section, this Note concludes that the
argued that a characterization test employed by the majority was contrary to the
functional test established by the court in Cinevision. Id. at 686-87 (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting).
26. For a discussion of these standards, see infra notes 99-239 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the standard that distinguishes between enactment
and enforcement, see infra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the standard that investigates the facts on which an
official act was based and the impact of the official act, see infra notes 161-91 and
accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of this combined standard, see infra notes 192-207 and
accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the standard that considers the scope of official action, see infra notes 135-60 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of the standard that solely examines the type of facts
that were considered by the officials, see infra notes 208-24 and accompanying
text.
32. For a discussion of the standard that focuses on whether the challenged
official action was part of the legislative process, see infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of the types of official immunity, see infra notes 41-67
and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of the history of legislative immunity, see infra notes
68-98 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of how the federal courts characterize the land use decisions of local government officials, see infra notes 99-239 and accompanying
text.
36. For a discussion of Zamsky, see infra notes 240-308 and accompanying
text.
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most appropriate standard for characterizing land use decisions is one
which distinguishes legislative acts from administrative acts on the basis
of whether the challenged official act constitutes an enactment or an en37
forcement of a land use law.

II. BACKGROUND

Two types of official immunity are recognized: absolute and qualified.3 8 Both types of immunity are defenses available to government
39
officials only when a "personal-capacity suit" is brought against them.
Government officials may not raise these defenses when an "official-capacity" suit is brought against them. 40 This section of the Note describes both types of immunity available to government officials and
gives an historical overview of the development of legislative immunity
with respect to section 1983 actions. This section also discusses the
characterization standards that federal courts have employed to determine whether section 1983 immunity attaches to a challenged official
act.
A.
1.

Types of Official Immunity

Absolute Immunity

An official may invoke the absolute immunity defense to a section
1983 action 41 if the official's function passes the Supreme Court's two37. For the author's recommendation as to the most appropriate standard
for characterizing land use decisions, see infra notes 309-14 and accompanying
text.
38. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1982) (asserting
that "[o]ur decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two kinds": absolute and qualified); Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 (6th
Cir. 1988) (stating that "[tihere are two types of immunities available to persons
performing certain governmental functions: absolute and qualified"). See generally Bley, supra note 3, at 836-39 (detailing Supreme Court's acknowledgement
of officials protected by absolute immunity and those protected by qualified
immunity).
39. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). Personal-capacity actions or individual-capacity actions are actions seeking personal liability against
government officials acting under color of state law, whereas official-capacity actions are actions against government officials as agents for the government entity. Id. at 165 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690 n.55 (1978)). In personal-capacity actions, the official can raise personal
immunity defenses, such as absolute or qualified immunity. Id. at 167.
40. Id. at 167 (holding that "personal immunity defenses" are unavailable
in official capacity actions). In official-capacity actions, the real party in interest
is the governmental entity. Id. at 166. As a result, in such actions, government
officials can claim only sovereign immunity. Id. at 167. The Graham Court
noted, however, that under Monell, official-capacity suits are no longer necessary
because local government entities can be sued directly. Id. at 167 n.14.
41. For an excerpt of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), see supra note 1. For a discussion concerning the policy reasons supporting the absolute immunity con-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss3/5

10

Przybylski: Characterization of Land Use Decisions: A Zone of Uncertainty
1992]

NOTE

673

prong test set forth in Owen v. City of Independence.42 The first prong of
the Owen test requires that the official's function must have been protected by immunity since the time section 1983 was enacted. 43 The second prong of the Owen test requires that the grant of absolute immunity
to the official's function must complement the goal of the Civil Rights
Act, which is to provide a "broad remedy for violations of federally protected rights."'4 4 If the official's function does not satisfy both prongs of
the Owen test, it will not be "incorporated" into section 1983, and the
official will not be able to successfully claim an absolute immunity defense. 45 The Owen Court recognized that there are at least three kinds
of functions that satisfy the Owen test for absolute immunity: legisla48
tive, 4 6 judicial 4 7 and prosecutorial.
Officials accorded absolute immunity cannot be held individually liable for damages in a section 1983 action unless their challenged act
reached beyond the scope of their official function. 49 Thus, the motives
of the officials are irrelevant in determining whether they are entitled to
cept within the context of legislative immunity, see infra notes 74-80 and
accompanying text.
42. 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
43. Id. The Court did not explicitly break down the test into two prongs.
Instead, it stated that "[wihere the immunity claimed by the defendant was well
established at common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, and where its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have construed
the statute to incorporate that immunity." Id.
44. Id. at 636, 638. Thus, the concept of immunity is inconsistent with the
primary goal of the Civil Rights Act to provide a broad remedy for the violations
of rights. However, the Court stated "that the tradition of immunity was so
firmly rooted in the common law and supported by such strong policy reasons
that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the
doctrine.' " Id. at 637 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)).
45. Id. at 638; see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988)
(where absolute immunity is not warranted, qualified immunity may be available). For a discussion of the point raised in Forrester, see infra note 57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of qualified immunity, see infra notes 55-67
and accompanying text.
46. Owen, 445 U.S. at 637 (traditional legislative immunity); see also Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (holding that defendant state legislators
were protected by legislative immunity). For a discussion of Tenney, see infra
notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
47. Owen, 445 U.S. at 637 (stating that judges' absolute immunity privilege
is preserved under § 1983 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967)));
see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978) (finding that functions of
executive officers were sufficiently judicial so as to afford them absolute
immunity).
48. Owen, 445 U.S. at 638; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424
(1976) (affording absolute immunity to state prosecutors in case of challenges to
initiation and pursuit of prosecution).
49. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951); see also Zamsky v.
Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 678 n.l (9th Cir. 1991); Dunmore v. City of Natchez, 703
F. Supp. 31, 33 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that conspiracy is not privileged by
legislative immunity because it goes beyond scope of legislative duty); NAHMOD,
supra note 9, § 7.01, at 3-4 (stating that court determining absolute immunity
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absolute immunity. 50 Additionally, although officials acting in a legislative capacity are protected against injunctive relief,5 1 officials acting in a
issue does not consider reasonableness of defendant's conduct). In describing
the scope of absolute immunity, the Ninth Circuit in Zamsky stated:
If state officials are absolutely immune, they can't be held liable, no
matter how lawful or lawless their conduct; they could single out an
individual based on his race, religion or dislike of sushi, and no damages would lie. The question here is whether the culpable will be held
accountable.
Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 678 n.1. See generally Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives
of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoenafor Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879,
929-30 (1985) (examining how motives of government officials affect immunity).
The Sixth Circuit has stated that "absolute immunity does not extend to
even traditionally legislative actions of officials taken either in bad faith, because
of corruption, or primarily in furtherance of personal instead of public interests."
Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1278 (6th Cir. 1988).
Nahmod has criticized this limitation of absolute immunity as unjustified and,
moreover, as undermining the purpose of granting officials absolute immunity.
NAHMOD, supra note 9, § 7.05, at 19 n.34. For the Supreme Court's articulation
of the purpose of affording officials absolute immunity, see infra notes 78-80 and
accompanying text.
It is important to note that while an "administrative decisionmaker" may be
found to be absolutely immune against civil damage actions, he or she may still
be compelled to testify or produce documents. Raveson, supra, at 927. The
Supreme Court recently held that city council members might be individually
subject to contempt sanctions for failing to comply with a judicial order requiring the council to immediately adopt an ordinance to stop segregation in the
housing market. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (5-4 decision). In Spallone, however, the Court noted that sanctions against the individual
council members should not be considered until contempt sanctions against the
city have failed to obtain the council's compliance. Id. Nonetheless, the four
dissenting Justices in Spallone argued in favor of the availability of contempt
sanctions "in extreme circumstances" against local officials acting in a legislative
capacity. Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Kevin R. Cole, Comment,
Civil Rights: A Callfor Qualified Legislative Immunity for City Council Members Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 66 WASH. L. REV. 169, 174 (1991) (stating that "absolute legislative immunity protects individual legislators from injunctive relief as well as
damages"). Cole argues that "the legislative function of city council members
should be qualifiedly, rather than absolutely, immune to section 1983 damages."
Id. at 171.
The Court has afforded various individuals absolute immunity. See Briscoe
v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (trial witnesses); Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (state supreme court justices acting in
legislative capacity); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (members of regional agency acting in legislative
capacity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (state judges); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators).
50. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 (stating that "[t]he claim of unworthy purpose
does not destroy the privilege").
51. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975)
(stating that Speech or Debate Clause of Constitution requires absolute immunity for legislators). The issue before the Court in Eastland was whether a federal court could enjoin Congress from issuing a subpoena duces tecum directing
a bank to produce the records of an organization claiming First Amendment
protection for those records. Id. at 492-93. The organization brought an action
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judicial or prosecutorial capacity are not similarly protected. 52
Procedurally, the issue of absolute immunity is resolved during the
pleading stages of a lawsuit. 53 Officials who are afforded absolute immunity, therefore, are not subjected to the expense of further judicial
54
proceedings.

2.

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for
civil damages when they perform discretionary functions. 5 5 Governagainst the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, "nine
other Senators, Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee, and the bank." Id. at 495.
The Court concluded that the Senators and the Chief Counsel were protected by
the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution and thus were immune from
the injunction order of the federal court. Id. at 501. The Court reasoned:
[A] private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a
distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Private civil
actions also may be used to delay and disrupt the legislative function.... We reaffirm that once it is determined that Members are acting
within the "legitimate legislative sphere" the Speech or Debate Clause
is an absolute bar to interference.
Id. at 503. Thus, while the Court in Eastland only addressed the legislative immunity of congressional legislators, the Court later asserted that state legislators
are also protected by legislative immunity in private civil actions for injunctive
relief. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446
U.S. 719, 733 (1980) (stating that Court has generally equated state legislator's
§ 1983 immunity with that of congressmen). The Court noted, however, that it
had not yet addressed this issue with respect to regional officials acting in a legislative capacity. Id. at 733 n. 11.
52. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 735-36 (noting that "we have never held
that judicial immunity absolutely insulates judges from declaratory or injunctive
relief with respect to theirjudicial acts" and that similarly, prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 damage actions but not from injunctive relief).
While prosecutors may be protected by legislative immunity in a suit for damages, "they are natural targets for § 1983 injunctive suits since they are the state
officers who are threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law." Id. at
736. As for judges, they are subject to liability for both injunctive relief and
attorneys' fees. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-44 (1984).
53. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976) (stating that procedurally, "absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's
actions were within the scope of the immunity"); see also Gorman Towers, Inc. v.
Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Absolute immunity defeats a
damage suit at the pleading stage .... ").
54. See Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 616 (affirming complete dismissal of lawsuit because defendant officials had absolute immunity).
55. Cole, Comment, supra note 49, at 173. At common law, qualified immunity protected officials from suit if they acted with "respect for 'basic, unquestioned constitutional rights' " and without malice. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
Cole presents the modern qualified immunity test as having two prongs. Under
Cole's test, to be afforded qualified immunity, the officials must prove: (1) that
they acted within their official duties and (2) that a reasonable person in their
position would not have known that the act would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Cole, Comment, supra note 49, at 173; see also Haskell v. Washing-
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ment officials perform discretionary functions when acting in an administrative or executive capacity.5 6 In section 1983 actions, courts may
afford qualified immunity to officials where absolute immunity is un57
available as a defense.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,58 the Supreme Court set forth a test to determine whether an official should be entitled to the qualified immunity
defense. 59 Under the Harlow test, in order for qualified immunity to attach, an official must show that a reasonable person in the official's position would not have known that his or her act constituted a violation of
the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 60 Yet, even if an official meets this
ton Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Officials performing
traditionally executive or administrative discretionary functions ... are entitled
to only qualified immunity ... if they can establish that the actions were within
the scope of their duties and were taken with a reasonable belief that they were
lawful.").
56. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988); see also Cinevision
Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1054 (1985) (holding that city councilmen acting in executive capacity are entitled to qualified immunity only); Bley, supra note 3, at 839 (local officials are
qualifiedly immune if acting in administrative capacity). Qualified immunity is
also called "good faith" immunity because a government official is afforded
qualified immunity only if he or she acted in good faith. Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1975); see also Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 577 (asserting that officials
are protected by qualified immunity only if they act in good faith).
The Court has afforded qualified immunity to various government officials.
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (presidential advisors); Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (cabinet officials); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974) (state governor).
Additionally, the scope of qualified immunity has widened to reach more
types of officials than it traditionally reached. See Cole, Comment, supra note 49,
at 173. For example, while governors and high level officials were traditionally
afforded absolute immunity for their discretionary functions under "modern
section 1983," such officials are only afforded qualified immunity for their executive and administrative decisions. Id.
57. PETERSON & MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12-15, at 574; see also Forrester,
484 U.S. at 229-30 (holding that judge was not entitled to absolute immunity but
not deciding whether judge was entitled to qualified immunity). In Forrester,the
Court stated that it "ha[d] recognized a category of 'qualified' immunity that
avoids unnecessarily extending the scope of the traditional concept of absolute
immunity." Id. at 224.
58. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
59. Id. at 818-19.
60. Id. at 818; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987)
(discussing Harlow test). To explain its standard, the Court in Harlow stated that
immunity would not be provided in instances where the law forbidding the official's conduct was clearly established, because a reasonable person in the official's position should know the law governing his conduct. Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818-19.
Prior to the establishment of the present test used to determine the availability of qualified immunity, the Court in Wood v. Strickland had established and
utilized a two-prong test. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The
Wood test consists of both objective and subjective prongs. Id. Under the objective prong, the official is not entitled to immunity unless he or she "knew or
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standard and qualified immunity could attach, immunity will be denied if
he or she acted with malice or contrary to established law. 6 '
Qualified immunity, like absolute immunity, is an affirmative defense; the defendant officials bear the burden of proof.62 Prior to the
Harlow decision, an issue relating to qualified immunity could only be
considered after all of the evidence had been presented before the trial
court. 63 Under Harlow, however, a court may apply the Harlow test during a motion for summary judgment. 64 This procedural development in
Harlow has "limited individual liability by [potentially] converting qualified immunity into the functional equivalent of absolute immunity." '6 5
Practically, unless officials commit an egregious act, the qualified immureasonably should have known" that his or her official act would violate the constitutional rights of the person affected. Id. The subjective prong examines
whether the official acted "with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the [person affected]." Id.
The Court refined the objective prong of the Wood test in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-65 (1978). In Procunier,the Court held that the defendant official would automatically pass the objective prong of the test if the
constitutional right was not clearly established at the time the defendant allegedly violated that constitutional right. Id. at 565. The subjective prong of the
qualified immunity defense established in Wood was recognized by the Court in
Harlow, but the Harlow Court found that "substantial costs attend the litigation
of the subjective good faith of governmental officials... [and] [i]nquiries of this
kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government." Harlow, 457 U.S. at
816-17. Thus, the presently applied Harlow test severely circumscribes the subjective prong of the two-prong test established in Wood. PETERSON & MCCARTHY,

supra note 3, § 12-15(B), at Supp. 63 (1985). The authors found that "[m]any
courts have interpreted ... [Harlow] as defining qualified immunity only in relation to objective factors." Id. at 64. However, some courts have not. Id.; see, e.g.,
McElveen v. County of Prince William, 725 F.2d 954 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 819 (1984); Stuebig v. Hammel, 714 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1023 (1984).
For an in-depth discussion of how the Supreme Court has shaped the twoprong test articulated in Wood, see PETERSON & MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at 57488.
61. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978); see also Harlow, 457
U.S. at 819 ("By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective
terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct.").
62. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) ("[T]his Court has never
indicated that qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff's
cause of action; instead we have described it as a defense available to the official
in question."). The Gomez Court further asserted that there is "no basis for imposing on the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate such a defense by stating in his
complaint that the defendant acted in bad faith." Id.
63. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976) ("The fate of an
official with qualified immunity depends upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at trial."); Gorman Towers,
Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that "qualified
immunity is available only if the evidence shows that [the official] actions were taken
in good faith") (emphasis added).
64. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
65. NAHMOD, supra note 9, § 8.04, at 115.
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nity defense will protect them against civil liability. 66 Nevertheless, being afforded absolute immunity is more favorable than qualified
immunity, because under absolute immunity, defendant officials "can't
'6 7
be held liable, no matter how lawful or lawless their conduct."
B.

Historical Overview of Legislative Immunity and Section 1983

1. Speech and Debate Clause
Absolute legislative immunity arose during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England as Parliament grew more and more independent from the king. 68 As the United States Supreme Court has
noted, legislative immunity is thought to be based on the English principle of freedom of parliamentary debate. 69 This concept was imported
to the American colonies and was later incorporated in the Articles of
Confederation. 70 Presently, the right to free legislative debate is embodied in the United States Constitution: "[F]or any Speech or Debate
66. See Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 678 n.l (9th Cir. 1991) (noting
that "[a]fter all, officials who don't violate clearly recognized rights will be entitled to qualified immunity-and will not be liable-no matter how this [absolute
immunity issue] is decided").
67. Id.
68. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
69. Id.; see also ABA Standing Committee on American Citizenship, American Bar Association, Bill of Rights (British), in 7 SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 36
(Richard L. Perry ed., 1959) (discussing historical evolution of Parliament's right
to freely debate); Raveson, supra note 49, at 893-97 (adopting premise "that the
privilege arose and evolved to preserve legislative independence in a system of
separation of powers").
During the Middle Ages, the freedom of parliamentary debate was generally
acknowledged and respected. Bill of Rights (British), supra, in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 36. The Strode's Act of 1512 gave statutory recognition of this right
by condemning the punishment of members of Parliament for their debates of
governmental matters within Parliament. Id. In 1610, the House of Commons,
in an address to James I, declared: "We hold it an ancient, general, and undoubted right of parliament to debate freely all matters which do properly concern the subject and his right or state; which freedom of debate being once
foreclosed, the essence of the liberty of parliament is withal dissolved." Id. Finally, in the Bill of Rights, Parliament codified its right to free debate in 1689,
thereby securing the freedom to debate governmental issues without fear of reprisal that Parliament members struggled for years to obtain from the king. Id.
The Bill of Rights of 1689 expressed the right to free debate as follows: "That
the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to
be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament." Tenney,
341 U.S. at 372 (quoting An Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the
Subject, and Settling the Succession of the Crown, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, C. II
(Eng. 1688)).
70. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372. The Tenney Court stated:
Freedom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a matter of
course by those who served the Colonies from the Crown and founded
our Nation. It was deemed so essential for representatives of the people that it was written into the Articles of Confederation and later into
the Constitution. Article V of the Articles of Confederation is quite
close to the English Bill of Rights: "Freedom of speech and debate in
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in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."' 7 1 Recognizing the historical importance of
legislative freedom, courts developed a common law immunity defense
for legislators. 72 The doctrine has expanded to include all legislative
73
acts whether performed by federal, state, regional or local officials.
2.

Section 1983 Immunity

a.

Immunity of State Legislators

In the early 1950s, the Supreme Court in Tenney v. Brandhove 4 addressed the viability of absolute legislative immunity within the context
Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court, or place
out of Congress ....
Id. (quoting ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION, art. V).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. The majority in Tenney found that legislative
immunity came out of this English tradition. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372. See generally Raveson, supra note 49, at 889-93 (discussing Speech or Debate Clause);
Richard D. Batchelder, Jr., Note, Chastain v. Sundquist: A Narrow Reading of the
Doctrine of Legislative Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 384, 385-91 (1990) (discussing development of Speech or Debate Clause legislative immunity). Raveson
argues that "[t]he speech or debate clause provides legislators with substantive
immunity, which has been invoked as a shield against criminal prosecution and
grand jury investigation initiated by the executive branch and damage and injunctive actions brought by private citizens." Raveson, supra note 49, at 891.
Moreover, Raveson notes that the Supreme Court has consistently held "that if
the speech or debate clause privilege is applicable, its protection is absolute."
Id.
In James Madison's notes of the debates at the Federal Convention of 1787,
Mr. Pinkney submitted a proposition to the House reflecting the attitude of the
Framers toward protection of their freedom to debate while wording legislation:
Each House shall be the Judge of its own privileges, and shall have
authority to punish by imprisonment every person violating the same;
or who, in the place where the Legislature may be sitting and during
the time of its Session, shall threaten any of its members for any thing
said or done on the House-or who shall assault any of them thereforor who shall assault or arrest any witness or other person ordered to
attend either of the Houses in his way going or returning; or who shall
rescue any person arrested by their order.
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
485-86 (Ohio University Press 1966).
72. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391, 404 (1979) (indicating that source of absolute immunity for state or
regional officials is not Speech or Debate Clause of Constitution). This clause of
the Constitution "reflect[s] the central importance related to legislative freedom
in our Nation." Id. The Court in Lake Country Estates then stated that the extension of legislative immunity to state legislators reflected its interpretation of federal law and did not depend on the Speech or Debate Clause in a state
constitution or state law. Id. Instead, this rule "recognizes the need for immunity to protect the 'public good.' " Id.
73. See, e.g., id. at 391 (regional agency members performing legislative acts
are entitled to absolute immunity); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 367 (state legislators protected by absolute immunity); Shoultes v. Laidlow, 886 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1989)
(legislative immunity extends to local officials acting in legislative capacity).
74. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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of section 1983 actions. 75 Initially, the Court determined that Congress
did not intend to abrogate absolute legislative immunity by enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.76 The Court then held that absolute legislative
immunity attached in actions brought under the Civil Rights statutes
where state legislators acted within the scope of their legislative
power. 7 7 It was not for the courts to decide issues involving the dishonest or vindictive motives that may influence legislators while they are
acting in their legislative roles. 78 Instead, "[s]elf-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such
abuses." ' 79 The Court concluded that legislators were entitled to the
privilege of absolute immunity to further the public good; otherwise,
75. Id. at 369. The case was brought, in part, under 8 U.S.C. § 43. Id. This
section was derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13
(1871), and has since been transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In Tenney, plaintiff Brandhove brought a civil rights action against members
of a committee of the California legislature. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 369 (committee's purpose was to make factual findings on "un-American activities").
Brandhove circulated a petition throughout the state legislature. Id. at 370. The
following day, Brandhove was summoned for a hearing before the committee.
Id. Brandhove alleged in his complaint that the hearing was designed to intimidate, silence and deter him from "exercising his constitutional rights of free
speech and to petition the Legislature for redress of grievances, and also to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, due process of law, and of the
enjoyment of equal privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United
States .. " Id. at 371. The Supreme Court held that the committee members
were "acting in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act, and that
the statute of 1871 does not create civil liability for such conduct." Id. at 379.
76. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. The Court stated: "We cannot believe that
Congress-itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a
tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language before us." Id. See generally Cole, Comment, supra note 49, at 17475. Cole found that "[tihe Tenney decision relied on a two-step canon of construction." Id. at 174. The first step was the Court's finding that when Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1871, state legislators enjoyed the privilege of
absolute immunity based on legislative tradition. Id. The second step was the
Court's finding that the "statute's language and legislative history failed to indicate Congress intended to abrogate this [legislative] immunity." Id. at 174-75.
Cole argued that in § 1983 cases, city council members should be afforded only
qualified legislative immunity rather than the absolute legislative immunity that
circuit courts have afforded them. Id. at 179. Cole asserts that the "critical issue" in determining whether to extend absolute or qualified immunity is:
"[W]hether a specific type of official conduct warrants the extra protection of
absolute immunity .... Id.; see also Raveson, supra note 49, at 929 ("The Court
has refused to extend absolute immunity to officials engaged in less sensitive
functions."). After considering the Supreme Court's method of inquiry, including the Tenney "two-step canon of construction" requiring investigation of the
legislative history, common law and public policy interests, Cole concludes that
absolute immunity for city council members finds no support. Cole, Comment,
supra note 49, at 179.
77. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379. This legislative immunity is absolute. Id. at
377-78. The Court stressed, however, that it was only considering the "scope of
the privilege as applied to the facts of the present case." Id. at 378.
78. Id.
79. Id. This statement reflects the Court's-age-old position ofjudicial con-
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they would be distracted from their duties by the threat of legal action
and the inconveniences of trial. 80
b.

Immunity of Municipalities

Twenty-nine years after Tenney, the Supreme Court in Owen v. City of
Independence8 l addressed the issue of whether the official immunity
granted in Tenney could be invoked by local governments, such as municipalities, in section 1983 actions. 8 2 Local governments had been subject
to liability under section 1983 since the Court's decision in Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 8 3 in which the Court expanded the meaning

of "person" to include local governments.8 4 As in Tenney, the Court in
servatism starting with Madison's transcriptions of the debates in the federal
convention. For a discussion of this position, see supra note 71.
80. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
81. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Owen did not involve a land use dispute. In Owen,

a police chief brought suit under the Civil Rights Act against the city, city manager and members of the city council, alleging that he was discharged in violation of his due process rights. Id. at 630.
82. Id. at 634-35.
83. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). While Monell also did not involve a land use dispute, its propositions have an impact on land use litigation. PETERSON & MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12-1, at 497. For a discussion of this point, see infra note
84. Monett involved a class action suit by female employees of the Department of
Social Services and the Board of Education in New York City alleging that an
official policy compelling pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence
before medically necessary deprived these female employees of their constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61.
84. Monett, 436 U.S. at 690. The Court in Monell stated that "[ojur analysis

of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion
that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be

included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Id. The Court further
stated that Congress intended municipalities to be liable only if the action was
based upon an official-municipal policy, thereby causing a constitutional tort. Id.
at 691. Thus, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the torts committed by its employees not based on official policy. Id. This is known as the
"respondeat superior exception." PETERSON & MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12-1,
at 498. Thus, a local government can be sued "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that
the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Monell, 436 U.S. at
694. The Monell Court's holding is significant in the land use context because
the vast majority of land use decisions are made by local governments. PETERSON & MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 12-1 to 12-2, at 496, 499 ("Since most attacks
on local land use decision-making include alleged violation of the United States
Constitution, particularly the due process, equal protection and 'taking' clauses,
plaintiff attorneys should consider the possibility of a Monell count [against the
local government body responsible for land use decisions]."). Thus, Monell

opened the door for aggrieved landowners to sue local governments under

§ 1983 in the federal courts. Id. § 12-1, at 497. Before Monell, aggrieved landowners could only institute actions based on constitutional violations of the Due
Process, Equal Protection and Takings Clauses against local governments in
state courts. Id. However, after Monell, local governments could be sued (under

certain circumstances) for violations of a federal statute, like § 1983. Id.
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Owen acknowledged that the tradition of affording governmental immunity is deeply rooted in the common law. 8 5 Thus, if Congress had intended to preclude the defense of absolute legislative immunity in
section 1983 actions, it would have done so explicitly. 86 The Court
therefore held that Congress' passage of section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act did not abrogate the federal common law immunities protecting
government officials. 8 7 The Owen Court then applied an historical analysis of immunity with respect to municipalities to determine whether
such governmental entities should be afforded immunity. 8 8 Based on its
findings, the Court concluded that municipalities could not enjoy the
privilege of either absolute or qualified immunity in section 1983
89
actions.
c.

Immunity of Regional and Local Officials Sued
in their Personal Capacities

One year before the Court's decision in Owen precluding municipal
entities from receiving official immunity, the Court in Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 9° was presented with a narrower

Prior to the Court's decision in Monel, the Court held that municipalities
were not "persons" for purposes of § 1983 and thus could not be sued under
that statute. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190-91 (1961), overruled by Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, it is interesting to
note that the Court in Monell analyzed the same legislative history as did the
Court in Monroe, and yet the Monell Court came to the opposite conclusion.
Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?,
50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 935, 963 (1989).

The Court has refined its holding in Monel in subsequent decisions. For
instance, the Court has held that "there must be an affirmative link between the
[municipality's] policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged." City
of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). According to the Tuttle
Court, "[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to
impose liability," unless the incident was done pursuant to an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy attributable to a municipal policy maker. Id. at 823.
See generally Freilich, supra note 1, at 788-93 (discussing impact of Tuttle on
Monel).

85. Owen, 445 U.S. at 637. The Owen Court further noted that governmental immunity is supported by "strong" policy concerns. Id.
86. Id. ("Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to
abolish the doctrine [of immunity]." (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555
(1967))).
87. Id.

88. Id. at 638.
89. Id. The Court stated: "Where the immunity claimed by the defendant
was well established at common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, and where
its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have
construed the statute to incorporate that immunity." Id. Because there was
neither tradition supporting municipal immunity, nor history and policy supporting a construction of § 1983 justifying such immunity, the Owen Court held
that municipalities were not entitled to assert either absolute or qualified immunity as a defense to § 1983 actions. Id.
90. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
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question: whether regional officials can be protected by legislative immu92
nity. 9 1 The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative.
The Court extended absolute legislative immunity to regional officials
based on its reasoning in Tenney. 9 3 According to the Court, absolute
immunity must not depend on what rules or procedures are available to
discipline those acting in a legislative capacity, but must instead depend
94
on furthering the goal of protecting the public good.
The Court in Lake Country Estates explicitly reserved addressing the
issue of whether the defense of absolute legislative immunity also extends to officials acting in a legislative capacity at the local level. 95 The
lower federal courts that have addressed this issue have held that local
officials acting in a legislative capacity are protected by the privilege of
absolute immunity. 96 Generally, these federal courts have reasoned that
91. Id. at 402-03. In Lake Country Estates, owners of property in the Lake
Tahoe Basin brought suit against the individual members of the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (TRPA), in part under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
members of TRPA destroyed the economic value of their property by enacting a
land use ordinance and general plan. Id. at 394. In the alternative, the petitioners alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, giving rise to an
implied cause of action. Id. at 395. The petitioners alleged that the respondents
had taken their property "without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 394.
The TRPA was organized in 1969 after Congress gave its consent to the
states of California and Nevada to create a single agency through which the two
states could coordinate and regulate development in the Lake Tahoe Basin and
conserve the Basin's natural resources. Id. The TRPA, therefore, is an interstate governmental entity and not an intrastate governmental entity.
92. Id. at 405. The precise issue the Court decided was whether, in § 1983
actions, absolute immunity should be extended to those individuals acting on
the regional level. Id. at 393. The Court struck down petitioners' arguments
that: (1) the source of immunity for state legislators is the Debate Clause of the
Constitution, which does not apply to the TRPA and (2) the TRPA does not
have a mechanism to discipline its members because, unlike in state legislatures,
"the threat of possible personal liability is necessary to deter lawless conduct."
Id. at 403-04. In response, the Court stated that immunity does not depend on
the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution but instead on the Court's interpretation of the federal law. Id.
93. Id. at 404-05. For an enumeration of the Court's reasons for affording
legislative immunity, see supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
94. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 404-05.
95. Id. at 404 n.26. The Court did not decide this issue because it was not
raised by the parties. Id. The Court impliedly admitted the importance of this
question because it stated that "regulation of land use is traditionally a function
performed by local governments." Id. at 402.
96. See Shoultes v. Laidlaw, 886 F.2d 114, 117 (6th Cir. 1989) (mayor and
city council members); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983) (borough council members, mayor and borough attorney); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir. 1983) (mayor, trustees, liquor control
commissioner and president of village board of trustees); Espanola Way Corp. v.
Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11 th Cir. 1982) (city commissioners), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1039 (1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 134950 (9th Cir. 1982) (board of supervisors); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643
F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1981) (mayor), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982);
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no difference exists between the necessity to protect legislative officials
on the federal, state and regional levels, and the necessity to protect
legislative officials on the local level. 9 7 In fact, courts have found that
the need for immunity is even greater for officials at the local level due
to the close proximity between local legislators and their constituents,
which leaves them more "vulnerable to and least able to defend law
suits."98

C.

Characterizationof Land Use Decisions to Determine
the Applicability of Immunity Defenses

Federal courts have observed that a zoning or land use planning
decision "that is legislative on its face may be construed to be administrative in character." 9 9 In addressing the characterization issue, federal
Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279-80 (4th Cir. 1980) (county council members); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-14 (8th Cir.
1980) (city directors); Searingtown Corp. v. Incorporated Village of North Hills,
575 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mayor and members of board of
trustees).
The First Circuit has explicitly avoided answering the question of whether
local officials can enjoy legislative immunity even in its most recent case. Vacca
v. Barletta, 933 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 194 (1991). As for
the Tenth Circuit, see Ditch v. Board of County Comm'rs, 650 F. Supp. 1245,
1247-48 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding that Tenth Circuit would extend immunity
principles to local legislative bodies), amended, 669 F. Supp. 1553 (1987)
(amended on different issue).
Note that "[i]t is only with respect to the legislative powers delegated to
them by the state legislatures that the members of local governing boards are
entitled to absolute immunity." Ryan, 889 F.2d at 1290 (3d Cir. 1989). For a
discussion of the source of the legislative powers of local officials, see supra note
5 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Shoultes, 886 F.2d at 117 (stating that because rewards of "pay
and prestige" are less at local level than at federal and state levels, threat of
liability might deter persons from serving at local level even more); Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 612 (no difference between need for immunity on state, regional
and municipal level).
98. Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 612 (quoting Ligon v. Maryland, 448 F.
Supp. 935, 947 (D. Md. 1977)). The Gorman Towers court stated: "[W]e perceive
no material distinction between the need for insulated legislative decision-making at the state or regional level and a corresponding need at the municipal
level. Indeed, the nature of municipal government may make the need to quell a
legislator's fear of personal retribution particularly compelling." Id.
In Ligon, the court found that "[p]articularly in the area of land use, where
decisions may have an immediate quantifiable impact on both the value and development of property, local legislators should be free to act solely for the public good without the specter of personal liability with the passage of each zoning
ordinance." Ligon v. Maryland, 448 F. Supp. 935, 947 (D. Md. 1977).
99. Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 611 n.5; see also Haskell v. Washington
Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1278 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Although zoning is ordinarily
a legislative activity, it is not always legislative for purposes of immunity."); Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of Horseheads, 551 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (W.D.N.Y.
1982) (zoning treated as legislative when act involves enactment or amendment
of zoning laws, but treated as executive or administrative when act involves enforcement of zoning law).
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courts have recognized that immunity depends upon the function in
which the defendant official was acting at the time of his or her allegedly
unconstitutional conduct.10 0 The federal courts, however, have applied
different standards to classify challenged official action as either legislative, administrative orjudicial.10 1 Federal courts differ in the characterization standards they utilize, perhaps because officials often act in a
02
combination of legislative, administrative and judicial capacities,'
making it difficult for courts to draw bright lines distinguishing one
function from another.' 0 3 Yet, federal courts have strived to draw these
lines in ways that will "preserve[] the balance between inhibiting public
officials from exercising their essential duties and protecting victims of
04
wrongs committed by public officials."'
100. See, e.g., Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1277-78 (because activities of most local
or municipal officials are not solely administrative, legislative or judicial, "the
scope of immunity depends on the nature of the activity involved"); Stewart v.
Lattanzi, 832 F.2d 12, 13 (2d Cir. 1987) ("This court looks at the function of the
individual in determining the appropriate level of immunity given a government
official."); Chapoose v. Hodel, 831 F.2d 931, 935 (10th Cir. 1987) (nature of
function of official determines whether immunity applies (quoting Greater Los
Angeles Council on Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1987))).
These federal courts followed the Supreme Court's holding that courts
must utilize a functional approach to determine whether the official is granted
absolute or qualified immunity. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224
(1988) (applying "functional" approach to characterization of official acts); Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978) (employing careful examination of
act to determine whether it is judicial, administrative or legislative).
101. This conclusion is apparent because federal courts have not used the
same standards to determine what type of acts are legislative and what type are
executive. For a discussion of the different standards courts have employed, see
infra notes 105-239 and accompanying text.
102. Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1278. For other authority that has concluded that
officials act in a mixture of functions, see supra note 14. The Haskell court broke
down the characterizations of official action into three groups: (1) officials acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are absolutely immune; (2) federal,
state and local legislators acting in a legislative capacity are absolutely immune;
and (3) officials acting in executive or administrative discretionary functions are
qualifiedly immune. Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1277.
At least two federal court decisions have analyzed cases to determine
whether a local official has acted in a judicial capacity. See, e.g., Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1991); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d
943, 952 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (holding that liquor control commissioner
acted in judicial capacity and, thus, was absolutely immune from suit). The Zamsky court found that the government officials did not act in a judicial capacity.
Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679. The court stated that the proceedings conducted by the
government officials were not adversarial, and their combined function of
lawmaker and monitor was inconsistent with the judicial role. Id.
103. Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1988) (line drawing
between functions is difficult); Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of Horseheads,
551 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The difficulty in determining the
nature of the immunity to be accorded in this case arises from the fact that the
[defendant zoning officials], comprising the legislative body of the Village, also
perform functions which are normally performed by the executive branch.").
104. Rateree, 852 F.2d at 951 (stating that immunity doctrine "embodies the
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Federal courts have utilized six different standards to characterize
challenged official actions. 10 5 For purposes of this Note, the six standards have been labelled below to facilitate their identification and discussion. 10 6 The first standard is the "rule enactment standard," which
focuses on whether officials were enacting or enforcing laws when performing the challenged act. 10 7 The second standard is the "general
scope standard," which focuses on whether the official act affected the
community at large or only specific individuals.' 0 8 The third standard is
the "fact/impact standard," which scrutinizes the types of facts that the
officials considered when performing the challenged act and the impact
of the act on the community.10 9 The fourth standard is the "enact/fact
standard," which combines the general scope and fact/impact standards.' l 0 The fifth standard is the "legislative fact standard," which
only focuses upon whether the officials considered legislative facts when
reaching the challenged decision."' The final standard is the "legislative process standard," which focuses upon whether the challenged offilong-held belief that this country is better served by limiting recovery to injured
parties rather than threatening the legislative process by placing legislators in
fear of lawsuits from exercising their legislative duties").
105. For a further discussion of the differing standards, see infra notes 113239. Nahmod has also stated that the federal circuit courts have established various standards to distinguish between legislative acts entitled to absolute immunity and "nonlegislative" acts entitled to qualified immunity. NAHMOD, supra
note 9, § 7.05, at 18-19. Nahmod delineated four factors that are "often" significant when characterizing official acts:
I. Was the challenged conduct a general policy or overall plan, or was
it administrative in nature because it was not based on legislative
facts and its impact was particularized?
2. Was the challenged conduct the adoption of prospective, legisla3.
4.

tive-type rules or was it the enforcement of such rules?
Was the challenged conduct the formulation of a policy or did it
involve monitoring and administering, thereby being executive in
nature?
Under state law, was the proper legislative procedure used in connection with the challenged conduct so that it was legislative in na-

ture, or was the challenged conduct not a proper exercise of
legislative powers?
Id.

106. Note that the characterization standards utilized by federal courts frequently overlap; nevertheless, the standards are clearly distinguishable from one
another.
107. For a discussion of how federal courts have applied a rule enactment
standard, see infra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
108. For a discussion of how federal courts have applied a general scope
standard, see infra notes 135-60 and accompanying text.
109.
dard, see
110.
dard, see

For a discussion of how federal courts have applied a fact/impact staninfra notes 161-91 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of how federal courts have applied an enact/fact staninfra notes 192-207 and accompanying text.

111. For a discussion of how federal courts have applied a legislative fact
standard, see infra notes 208-24 and accompanying text.
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cial act was part of the legislative process.'12 Through case illustrations,
this section of the Note describes all six characterization standards.
1.

The "Rule Enactment Standard".- Altaire Builders, Inc. v.
Village of Horseheads

Federal court decisions that utilize a rule enactment standard for
determining section 1983 immunity attempt to draw a bright line to
l3
distinguish between legislative and administrative/executive acts."
112. For a discussion of how federal courts have applied a legislative process standard, see infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
113. A rule enactment standard has also been used by courts when characterizing the acts of officials in procedural due process claims. See Zoning, supra
note 3, at 1509-10; see, e.g., Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981). In Rogin, the Third Circuit determined
that an act would be legislative if it involved the formulation of general policy
statements affecting all present and future landowners in a municipality. Id. at
693. Conversely, an act would be administrative if it applied a previously formulated federal policy to specified landowners. Id.
Rogin involved a class action suit brought by homeowners against a developer, township, township zoning officer and board of supervisors requesting injunctive relief and money damages caused by a delay in the construction of their
homes. Id. at 683. The developer crossclaimed against the township and zoning
officials, bringing the claim under the Civil Rights Act. Id. The developer alleged that the officials' delay in issuing building permits, which caused subsequent cost escalation, was done to discourage construction of the development,
thereby violating the developer's due process and equal protection rights. Id.
The developer's request for building permits was denied by the township because the developer's plan "no longer complied with the township's zoning ordinance, which had been amended" about a month after the original plan had
been approved. Id. at 682-83. The Rogin court held that the passing of the
amendment was a legislative act. Id. at 693. The court reasoned that the
amendments were general statements of policy and, therefore, legislative. Id.
However, had the amendments been mere applications of policy to a specific
landowner, they would not be legislative. Id. The Rogin court then found that
the Zoning Hearing Board's refusal to grant the developer building permits was
an administrative act because it merely involved application of zoning policies to
a specific parcel of land. Id. at 694.
Additionally, the Rogin court rejected the notion that the differential impact
of general legislation on certain groups of landowners should be part of the
court's characterization standard. Id. at 693 n.60. The court illustrated this
point by the following example:
[Ain ordinance limiting the height of buildings will affect a landowner
who is planning to build or is constructing a fifty story building differently than it will his neighbor who owns a renovated, three-story colonial townhouse ....
That differential impact does not however, change
the character of the legislative act ....
Id. As illustrative of administrative action, the court suggested that the denial of
a variance would constitute administrative action because it involves general policy considerations as well as application of that policy to a specific landowner.
Id.
The commentator in Zoning has described this standard as one that "distinguishes general policy formulations, which are considered legislative, from specific applications of previously formulated policy, which are considered
administrative." Zoning, supra note 3, at 1509. The commentator dislikes this
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Under the rule enactment standard, legislative acts are distinguished
from administrative/executive acts on the basis of whether the officials
were enacting laws or enforcing them.l1 4 Thus, the enactment or adoption of "prospective, legislative-type rules" constitutes a legislative
act, I 5whereas the enforcement of general laws or "monitoring compliance" with established rules constitutes an administrative or executive
act.' 16 More precisely, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, legislative
acts involve policy formulation and administrative or executive acts involve ad hoc decision-making.' 17
Three requirements must be satisfied for an "enactment" to take
place. First, a policy must be formulated or rejected.' 18 Second, the
policy must be general or, in other words, applicable to an open class of
approach because: "[A]lthough [it is] often useful, [it] produces the anomalous
result that a hearing would be granted whenever a decision implemented a previous policy, but could be denied whenever a decision on a specific application is
used to announce a new policy." Id. at 1510. The commentator then provides
the following illustration as to the problems that may result from application of
this standard:
[I]f the decisionmakers [such as local government officials] decide to
change a previous policy favoring single-family dwellings, they could
constitutionally deny a building permit for a single-family house without granting a hearing to the applicant. On the other hand, if the board
had chosen to follow the previously established policy in favor of single-family housing, they could not have denied a hearing right to the
affected interests.
A similar problem . . . [arises when] zoning amendments, even
though directed at a very small area and proposed by a single landowner, are [determined to be] legislative in nature.
Id. at 1510 n.41.
114. See, e.g., Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1991); Front
Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77,
79 (4th Cir. 1989); Scott v. Greenville, 716 F.2d 1409, 1423 (4th Cir. 1983);
Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of Horseheads, 551 F. Supp. 1066, 1073
(W.D.N.Y. 1982); Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705, 712 (D. Neb. 1976).
115. Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423 (holding that enforcement of legislative-type
rules is administrative act); see also Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 79 (finding that "defendant's denials of requests for sewer service were not legislative actions" because they dealt "with zoning enforcement rather than rulemaking" (quoting
Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423)).
116. See, e.g., Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 79 (asserting that officials who enforce
legislative rules rather than make them are entitled only to qualified immunity
because enforcement is not a legislative act); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara,
689 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that local legislature that enforces
general zoning ordinance is acting in executive capacity); Altaire Builders, 551 F.
Supp. at 1073 (finding that zoning is executive or administrative function when
it involves enforcement of zoning law).
117. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679.
118. See Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 79 (holding that defendants' decision to
not extend sewer service is not a legislative decision because it involved zoning
enforcement rather than rulemaking); Minton v. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd.,
803 F.2d 129, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that on remand, district court must
determine whether officials in making decision were involved in "public-policymaking traditionally associated with the legislative functions"); Scott v. Green-
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persons.' 19 Third, the policy must be made binding as a rule of conduct. 120 Thus, for example, while a decision to deny a building permit
is a binding rule of conduct as to the permit applicant, the decision is
not an enactment because it is not a formulation of general policy,
though it may have been motivated by policy considerations. If the
mere fact that a decision is based on policy indicates that the decision
should be categorized as an enactment, the denial of a building permit
could be considered a legislative act. Such an act, however, would more
properly be characterized as administrative because it reaches beyond
the scope of enactment as defined above and into the area of
2
enforcement. ' '

For an official's act to be classified as an "enforcement," it too must
meet three requirements. First, the official must make a decision that
addresses or directly applies to specific individuals.12 2 Second, the decision must have been made pursuant to an established law.' 23 Third, the
decision must be binding on the individual. 124 The literal meaning of
ville, 716 F.2d 1409, 1423 (4th Cir. 1983) (determining that legislative acts involve adoption of "prospective, legislative-type rules").
The term policy "as applied to a law, ordinance, or rule of law, denotes its
general purpose or tendency considered as directed at the welfare or prosperity

of the state or community."

BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY

1157 (6th ed. 1990).

119. See Kuzinich, 689 F.2d at 1349 (holding that enactment of general zoning ordinance is legislative act).
120. Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 580 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that legislative acts "involve the formulation of policy 'as a defined and
binding rule of conduct' " (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424
(1944))), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); see also Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423 (asserting that officials act in legislative capacity when adopting "legislative-type
rules"); Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of Horseheads, 551 F. Supp. 1066, 1073
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that legislative function "involves the ena-tment or
amendment of the zoning laws").
121. See Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423 (holding that when officials go beyond
adopting rules and into area of enforcement, they act in executive capacity). Denying a building permit is an enforcement-type decision because it is applying
enacted policy to a specific situation and, therefore, is "outside the ... [officials']
range of legitimate legislative duties." Id. at 1423 (footnote omitted).

122. See Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park v. Town of Front Royal,

865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that failure to authorize sewer service
to plaintiffs was not legislative decision); Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580 (concluding
that "monitoring and administering the contract by voting on the various proposed concerts" is executive function); Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423 (noting state
court's determination that action at issue was "functionally in the nature of executive review of a specific building permit application" and therefore executive
act).
123. See Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
monitoring compliance of county land use plan with established law or regulations is executive act); Minton v. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 135
(5th Cir. 1986) (asserting that applying existing public policies is administrative
function);Jodeco, Inc. v. Hann, 674 F. Supp. 488, 495 (D.N.J. 1987) (determining that zoning officials who enforce already existing zoning laws are acting in
administrative, executive or ministerial capacity).
124. See Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 78-79 (due to defendant officials' refusal to
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the term "enforcement" is: "the act of putting ...a law into effect; the
execution of a law; the carrying out of a mandate or command."' 12 5 In
the land use context, enforcement seems to include both requiring a
landowner to comply with the law and applying a law to specific individ12 6
uals who seek a decision from government officials.
The district court's decision in Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of Hor-

seheads 127 further illustrates the application of the rule enactment standard. In Altaire, the plaintiff submitted an application for a planned unit
development (P.U.D.) to the Village of Horseheads. 128 The Board of
Trustees denied the application, even though the application complied
with the Village's ordinances. 12 9 The plaintiff brought an action before
3°
the state trial court seeking an annulment of the Board's decision.
After three such proceedings in the state trial court, the plaintiff's requested building permit was issued.iSi During the interim, however, interest rates had greatly increased, making it financially impossible to
complete the plaintiff's building plans. 132 The plaintiff thereupon
provide sewer service to plaintiffs, plaintiffs were "deprived ...of all economi-

cally viable and reasonable uses of their land"); Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 581 (holding that councilman's vote against corporation's proposed concerts was
executive act).
125. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1990).
126. See, e.g., Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that order to institute suit to abate business of operator of
adult movie theatre is executive in nature); Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of
Horseheads, 551 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that officials'
refusal to approve planned unit development (P.U.D.) "turned on the project's
compliance with P.U.D. regulations" and, therefore, was executive act).
In a case decided by the Fifth Circuit, the court did not utilize the term
enforcement at all and instead defined an administrative act as the application of
prior existing general policy. See Minton v. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d
129, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1986) (directing lower court on remand to determine
whether decision of defendant school board members involved "the degree of
discretion and public-policy-making traditionally associated with legislative functions" or whether decision involved "administrative application of existing policies"). Minton was not a land use case. Rather, the plaintiff in Minton sued the
parish school board under § 1983 seeking recovery on a tort claim for which the
board refused to appropriate funds. Id. at 130. The court could not decide
whether the board members were entitled to official immunity because the issue
was not fully developed by the parties; the court remanded the claim against the
board members to decide this issue. Id. at 135-36.
The Fifth Circuit has seemingly applied a different standard to cases concerning variances or "spot zoning." See Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish, 937 F.2d
172, 174 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that if decision involves evaluation of legislative
facts, then it is legislative in character), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 939 (1992). For a
discussion of Calhoun, see infra notes 212-24 and accompanying text. For a definition of "spot zoning," see infra note 220.
127. 551 F. Supp. 1066 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
128. Id. at 1068.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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brought a section 1983 action before the district court against the Board
for violating his constitutional rights under the Takings, Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses.'3 The district court held that the Board
could only be afforded qualified immunity because its decision to deny
the plaintiff a building permit "turned on the project's compliance with
P.U.D. regulations," and therefore constituted an enforcement of a zon34
ing law-an executive act. 1
2.

The "General Scope Standard": Ryan v. Burlington County and
Haskell v. Washington Township

The category of federal court decisions that apply a general scope
standard distinguish legislative acts from administrative acts on the basis
of how generally or specifically the challenged official act affected individuals in the community. 13 5 The Third and Sixth Circuits favor this
standard.
1 36
The Third Circuit's decision in Ryan v. Burlington County,
although not a land use case, established a characterization standard
that contains a substantive requirement and a procedural requirement,
both of which must be met for an official act to be characterized as legislative. 137 Under the substantive requirement, the act must be "legislative in character," involving policy-making decisions of general
scope.13 8 If an official act affected only a small group of individuals, that
act would be characterized as administrative, not legislative. 139 Under
the procedural requirement, the act must have been passed under constitutionally acceptable legislative procedures "in order to assure that
the act is a legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the
0
people which the governing body has been chosen to serve."14
133. Id. at 1068-69.
134. Id. at 1073, 1074-75.
135. See, e.g., Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir.
1989) (finding that legislative acts involve policy-making decisions that are general in scope); Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1278 (6th Cir.
1988) (establishing general policy is legislative whereas directing acts at specific
individuals is administrative (citing Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st
Cir. 1984))).
In rejecting this test, the Ninth Circuit labelled this approach as one which
merely scrutinizes the scope of the official act. Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 579 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
136. 889 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1989).
137. Id. at 1290.
138. Id. at 1290-91 ("Legislative acts are those which involve policy-making
decisions of a general scope or . . . [in other words], legislation involves linedrawing.").
139. Id. at 1291.
140. Id. The procedural requirement seems to be equivalent to the enactment requirement under the rule enactment standard. For a discussion of the
enactment prong of the rule enactment standard, see supra notes 115, 118-121
and accompanying text.
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In Ryan, a pretrial detainee brought a civil rights action against certain jail personnel and a county board of freeholders after being rendered quadriplegic from an attack by an inmate. 14 1 The court applied
its substantive and procedural requirements to the facts of the case in
order to determine whether the defendants acted legislatively and would
thus be entitled to absolute immunity. 142 The court concluded that the
substantive requirement was not met because the decisions of the defendants regarding the inmates or the staff, though made by a legislative
body, did not affect the entire jail community. 14 3 The court also concluded that the procedural requirement was not met because the defendants passed no ordinance or resolution with regard to the operation
of the jail. 144 The court therefore held that the defendants were not
45
entitled to absolute legislative immunity. 1
The Sixth Circuit established its characterization standard in Haskell
v.Washington Township. 14 6 In that case, a physician, Haskell, brought a
section 1983 action seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief
against the Washington Township Board of Trustees for blocking his
proposed outpatient abortion clinic.' 4 7 Haskell made an offer to
purchase an office building where the outpatient clinic was to operate. 148 After the offer had been conditionally accepted, the Trustees decided to block the opening of the proposed clinic because of inadequate
parking. 149 Haskell then announced that he was abandoning his plan to
open the clinic in that office building. 150 Subsequently, the Township
151
enacted a zoning ordinance that zoned abortion clinics as "B-3."
The court pointed out that "[a]t that time, there were 3.317 acres of
Washington Township zoned B-3, and all of it was fully occupied by a
52
cement company."1
The Haskell court established the following analysis for its characterization standard. First, a court must determine the underlying purpose
of the official act.15 3 Second, a court must determine what persons were
141. Id. at 1288-89.
142. Id. at 1291.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1292. As is evident from the case discussion, the court in Ryan
seemed to apply its test literally, looking at the effects of an official decision and
also whether the decision is a product of a legislative process. See id. at 1291.
While the Ryan court has formulated a facile test, it is unclear whether this test,
though established in a § 1983 suit and therefore applicable to all § 1983 actions, will be applied in the same manner for land use cases.
146. 864 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1988).
147. Id. at 1271.
148. Id. at 1270.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. To support the first prong of its characterization standard, the
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affected by the act. 154 If the purpose of the act was to establish general
policy, the act is legislative. 155 If the act singled out specific individuals
in the community and affected them differently than others, the act is
administrative.15 6 The Haskell court did not apply its newly established
standard to the case; instead, it remanded the case to the district
court. 157
Taken literally, the general scope standard broadens the meaning of
"legislative act" beyond that contemplated by the rule enactment standard. 1 58 Under the Third and Sixth Circuits' general scope standard,
absolute legislative immunity attaches not only where official acts involve the formulation of general policy, as under the rule enactment
standard, but also where official acts involve the formulation of general
policy that is aimed at only certain persons in the community. Presumably then, if officials were to enact an ordinance precluding farming in a
county that contained only one farm, the enactment of the ordinance
would be deemed an administrative act under the general scope standard, and the officials enacting the ordinance would be afforded only
qualified immunity. 159 Such a result would be contrary to the accepted
view that an enactment by an official is clearly a legislative act. 160 Moreover, application of the general scope standard may sometimes lead to
an illogical result. For example, if an ordinance is passed precluding
dentists' offices in a residential area, would a court espousing a general
scope standard characterize the act of voting on the ordinance as legislative if there are no dentists' offices in the area and administrative if there
are already some dentist offices in the area? Whether the general scope
standard will have the same far-reaching effects as the above hypotheticals suggest is unclear under present federal court decisions.
3.

The "Fact/Impact Standard".: Stone's Auto Mart, Inc. v.
City of St. Paul
The third category of federal decisions utilizes a fact/impact charac-

Haskell court cited the enforcement prong of the Ninth Circuit's standard set in
Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara. Id. (citing Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara,
689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982)). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
decisions regarding the enforcement prong of its characterization standard, see
infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
154. Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1278.
155. Id.

156.
157.
158.
of Santa

Id. (quoting Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1984)).
Id.
See id. (combining the rule enactment standard in Kuzinich v. County
Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982) and the second prong of the

fact/impact standard in Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1984)).

159. See Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1291 (3d Cir. 1989)
("Where the decision affects a small number or a single individual, the legislative power is not implicated, and the act takes on the nature of administration.").
160. NAHMOD, supra note 9, § 7.05, at 17-18.
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terization standard that was first outlined in a Harvard Law Review article. 161 The commentator of that article established this characterization
standard for the purpose of determining whether a person affected by a
land use decision is entitled to procedural due process protection; it was
not established for the purpose of determining section 1983 immunity. 162 In their decisions, however, federal courts have adopted this
test without considering whether it is proper to transfer such an inquiry
16 3
into the realm of section 1983 immunities.
The fact/impact standard has two prongs. The first prong characterizes the facts utilized by officials to support the challenged land use
decision as legislative or administrative. 16 4 "Legislative facts" are generalizations about a particular policy that serve to aid legislators in
"decid[ing] questions of law, policy and discretion."1 6 5 "Administrative
facts," on the other hand, are facts that "relate with greater specificity to
individuals or particular situations." 166 For the basis of the article's fact
prong, federal courts and the commentator of the law review article rely
161. See Zoning, supra note 3, at 1510-11. Three federal courts have utilized
this approach. See Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding
the analysis in Zoning persuasive); Stone's Auto Mart, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 721
F. Supp. 206, 209 (D. Minn. 1989) (adopting two tests suggested in Zoning); Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (adopting twopronged analysis of Zoning). In a more recent decision, though not a land use
case, the First Circuit affirmed its adoption of the fact/impact test. See Vacca v.
Barletta, 933 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.) (holding that chairperson of school committee is not absolutely immune from suit when he directed police to remove committee member from meeting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 194 (1991).
162. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1508. In determining entitlement to procedural due process protection, "[ilt is an established constitutional principle that
procedural due process attaches only to administrative or adjudicatory action by
the state, and not to legislative action." Id.
163. For a list of the federal courts that have adopted the fact/impact standard, see supra note 161.
164. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1510-11.
165. Id. (citing Kenneth C. Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70
L. REV. 193, 199 (1956) [hereinafter Davis, Trial-Type Hearing]); see also
KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.02, 7.06 (1958) [hereinafter DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw]. Davis defines legislative facts as "not usually
HARV.

concern[ing] the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal
decide questions of law and fact." Id. § 7.02, at 413.
166. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1511 (citing Davis, Trial-Type Hearing,supra note

165, at 199). Note that the authors of Zoning have renamed Davis' "adjudicative
facts" as "administrative facts." See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, supra note 165,
§ 7.02, at 413. According to Davis, "adjudicative" facts are "facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts usually
answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive
or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a
jury case." Id. § 7.02, at 413. Davis also admits that borderline cases exist

where there is not a clear distinction between the legislative and administrative
facts. Davis, Trial-Type Hearing, supra note 165, at 200. In these cases, the facts

have characteristics of both legislative and administrative components. Id.
Therefore, this distinction is "susceptible to semantic manipulation." Zoning,
supra note 3, at 1511 n.45 (quoting Glen 0. Robinson, The Making of Administra-
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on Kenneth Davis' treatise on administrative law.1 67 Davis makes a distinction between legislative facts and adjudicative facts, the latter being
comparable to "administrative facts" defined above. To describe adjudicative facts, Davis explained:
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties-who did what, where, when, how, and with what
motive or intent-the court or agency is performing an adjudicative function ....
Stated in other terms, adjudicative facts are those [facts] to
which the law is applied in the process of adjudication.... They
relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses ....
[F]indings of adjudicative
68
evidence. 1

facts must be

supported

by

To define legislative facts, Davis stated:
When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting
legislatively; the courts have created the common law through
judicial legislation, and the facts 'which inform the tribunal's
legislative judgment are called legislative facts.
Legislative facts are the facts which help the tribunal determine
the content of law and of policy and help the tribunal to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of
action to take. .

.

. [They are] ordinarily general and do not

concern the immediate parties.
[F]indings or assumptions of legislative facts need not be, frequently are not, and sometimes cannot be supported by
69

evidence. 1

Thus, as Davis explains, both types of "facts" are those considerations
made by an agency or court when deciding cases. 170
The second prong of the fact/impact standard is used to determine
the impact of the land use decision on members of the community.17' If
the decision has an impact on specific individuals, affecting them differtive Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure
Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 503-04 (1970)).

167. See Stone's Auto Mart, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 721 F. Supp. 206, 209

(D. Minn. 1989); Zoning, supra note 3, at 1510. See generally DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 165, § 15.03, at 353.
168. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, supra note 165, § 15.03, at 353.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1511.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 5
696

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

37: p. 663

ently than others, it is an administrative act. 172 If the decision has an
173
impact on the public in general, it is a legislative act.
Under this standard, denying a variance to a specific builder who
has applied for the variance would be an administrative act. 17 4 Not only
would the builder have a due process right to sue the local officials, but
neighboring landowners potentially affected by the variance decision
would also have a right to sue. 175 On the other hand, if zoning officials
enacted a zoning ordinance which sets the maximum height of buildings
permitted in a certain area, the enactment would be legislative in character. ' 76 The latter act is legislative because the act was not taken against
certain, specified persons even though specific groups may be affected
by the ordinance if they owned or had plans to construct buildings
77
higher than what was permitted by the ordinance.1
The federal District Court for the District of Minnesota adopted the

fact/impact standard in Stone's Auto Mart, Inc. v. City of St. Paul.178 In that
case, a corporation selling used cars as its business and that corporation's owners brought a section 1983 action against the City of St. Paul,
city council and city council members for voting to deny the plaintiffs'
rezoning petition that would have permitted the plaintiffs to establish a
used car lot. 179 The committee staff report supporting the city council's
decision stated that the land use surrounding the relevant plot was residential and concluded that were the land owned by the plaintiffs rezoned to allow for the used car lot, the resulting increase in automobile
use on the land "would be inconsistent with the policies of the city's
zoning plan."' 80 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the reasons stated in the committee staff report were simply a pretext for
preventing businesses owned by African-Americans from operating in
their community.'18 The defendants moved for summary judgment on
172. Id. The extent to which a government act singles out particular individuals dictates the level to which the government must extend individual procedural due process rights. Id. at 1512.
173. Id. at 1511-12.
174. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1511; Stone's Auto Mart, 721 F. Supp. at 209
(quoting Zoning, supra note 3, at 1511). The denial of the variance would be
considered an administrative act because it specifically affects only the applicant
builder, regardless of whether the act was grounded primarily on general policy
considerations. Id.
175. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1511. Under this theory, the neighboring landowners also have a due process right because the denial of the variance indirectly affects them. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. For an act to be characterized as administrative, the act must single
out particular individuals. Id.
178. 721 F. Supp. 206 (D. Minn. 1989).
179. Id. at 207-08.
180. Id. at 207.

181. Id. at 208.
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the grounds of legislative immunity.' 8 2
In applying the fact prong of its characterization test, the court determined that "the city council's decision was based on particularized
facts concerning the character of the area in which plaintiffs' property
was located, the nature of the use proposed by the plaintiffs and the
appropriateness of that use under the previously-adopted zoning pol18 3
icy."'

The court concluded that the city council considered adminis-

trative and not legislative facts when reaching its decision. 18 4 In
applying the impact prong of the test, the court determined that "[tihe
decision not to rezone was one affecting specifiable individuals, not a
broad class of persons" and thus was an administrative act.' 8 5 Based
upon the application of both prongs of its characterization standard, the
court held that the city council members acted in an administrative capacity when they refused to rezone the plaintiffs' property and were
8 6
therefore not entitled to absolute legislative immunity.'
As is evident from Stone's Auto Mart, the fact/impact standard is similar to the general scope standard because, in part, it determines whether
a decision, though of general application, impacts upon "specifiable in182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id.

186. Id. Prior to the Stone's Auto Mart decision wherein the Minnesota dis-

trict court adopted the fact/impact standard, the Eighth Circuit had addressed
the extent of immunity granted to local officials. See O'Brien v. City of Greers
Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1989). The fact/impact standard, however,
was not used in O'Brien.
In O'Brien, an alderwoman brought a § 1983 action against the mayor of the
city and another alderman. Id. at 1116. The alderwoman alleged that the defendants deprived her of her constitutional rights by refusing to appropriate
$2,000 from a fund of the Arkansas Municipal League Defense Program in order
to support her defense in a slander suit. Id. at 1116-17. Because the vote on the
appropriation of the $2,000 was the only vote taken at the meeting, the court
concluded that the refusal of defendants to appropriate the $2,000 was an executive act. Id. at 1120. Therefore, the defendants enjoyed only a qualified immunity because they were acting in an executive capacity. Id. at 1119-20.
Apparently, the district court in Stone's Auto Mart did not interpret O'Brien as
establishing a standard for distinguishing between legislative and executive acts,

because the district court adopted the fact/impact standard. See Stone's Auto

Mart, 721 F. Supp. at 209. The court in Stone's Auto Mart went so far as to apply a
fact/impact standard to the facts in O'Brien, perhaps to prove that its approach is
consistent with O'Brien. Id. at 209-10. In applying a fact/impact standard to the
facts in O'Brien, the court in Stone's Auto Mart stated that the city council's deci-

sion not to appropriate funds was "apparently" based on administrative facts.
Id. at 210. The court noted that the decision could have been based on legislative facts if the council had decided "whether or not the city should, as a matter
of policy, indemnify its public officials for acts taken in their official capacity."

Id. Because the decision affected one particular person (the alderwoman) and
not a class of persons, the court concluded that the decision constituted an ad-

ministrative act. Id.
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87
dividuals" in the community and affects them differently than others.1
Both standards, therefore, reach beyond the rule enactment standard. 188 Yet, the fact/impact standard also differs from both the rule
enactment and general scope standards in that only the fact/impact
standard investigates the types of facts-legislative or administrativethat the zoning officials considered to make their land use decision. 189
According to the commentator of the law review article that introduced
this standard, this inquiry "provides a reasonably clear and feasible
means for distinguishing policy decisions from specific applications of

the policy."' 90
Thus, when the fact/impact standard is broken down into its component prongs, it is apparent that the purpose of the fact prong is to
evaluate the decisions of administrative agencies in a particular case,
such as a hearing on a variance. The purpose of the impact prong is to
evaluate the decisions of a legislative body when enacting-laws not connected with a particular case. Because the fact/impact standard
originated in a procedural due process discussion, it is difficult to conclude that such an inquiry is proper in a section 1983 action for the
purpose of resolving the immunity issue. 19 1
187. See Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (lst Cir. 1984) (stating that
one prong of characterization standard to be applied determines whether official
action points to specific individuals or establishes general policy); Stone's Auto
Mart, 721 F. Supp. at 206, 209 (same); Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F. Supp. 1331,
1333 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); Zoning, supra note 3, at 1510 (same).
188. See Stone's Auto Mart, 721 F. Supp. at 209; Zoning, supra note 3, at 1510
(stating that impact prong makes allowance for possibility that "new policies
may be articulated through specific decisions of limited applicability").
189. See Stone's Auto Mart, 721 F. Supp. at 206, 210. The court in Stone's Auto
Mart commented that the Sixth Circuit, which utilizes the general scope standard, only embraces the impact prong of the fact/impact standard or "test,"
implying that the fact prong of the test is in fact a distinct, if not novel test. Id. at
210 (illustrating that Sixth Circuit in Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d
1266 (6th Cir. 1988), "adopts the second of the two tests ... as a means for
distinguishing between legislative and administrative zoning action").
190. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1510.
191. In Zoning, two flaws become apparent from the commentator's explication of the fact/impact standard: (1) uncertainty in the meaning of the impact
prong and (2) the possible inappropriateness of using legislative and administrative facts to distinguish between legislative and administrative acts.
Regarding the impact prong of the standard, the commentator gives inconsistent illustrations of this prong. Zoning, supra note 3, at 1509-13. Though the
article states that the differentiated impact of an official act among members of a
community constitutes an administrative act, the article asserts that the establishment of building height limits, for example, would be a legislative act even
though it probably would have a differentiated impact on members in the community. Id. at 1511. The article then explains, without more, that such an act is
legislative because it was not taken against specific members of the community.
Id. The article's explanation of the impact prong of the standard in this instance
makes the test more akin to the rule enactment test, in which the impact of an
official decision on the community is ignored and the focus is on whether the
decision reflects an enforcement of policy. Due to this apparently contradictory
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The "Enact/Fact Standard".- Moore v. Trippe

The fourth category of federal decisions utilizes both the rule enactment and fact/impact standards for determining whether an official act
is legislative or administrative.' 9 2 One decision viewed the components
of these standards as simply factors that should be taken into consideration when deciding whether to grant immunity to local officials. 19 3 Anexplanation of the impact prong of the standard, the meaning and proper application of this prong is uncertain.
It may also be problematic to transfer the concept of legislative and administrative facts to the context of characterizing official acts for the purpose of determining § 1983 immunity because these facts are utilized in a very limited
context. As Davis explains, such facts are considered to decide cases by courts
and agencies. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 165, § 15.03, at 353. Da-

vis notes that legislative facts are "ordinarily general and do not concern the
immediate parties ... [and] the legislative element is either absent or unimportant or interstitial because . . . the applicable law or policy has already been
established." It is only when a court or agency creates law or policy that it resorts to legislative facts, whether or not they were developed in the record of the
case. Id.
Just because legislative and administrative facts are considered when a case
is brought before a court or administrative agency, it does not necessarily mean
that such facts "on the record" can be transferred to the law-making forum. In
the law-making forum, there is a legislative history and other sources for a court
hearing a § 1983 immunity case to determine what policies supported the enactment of a law. This prong of the fact/impact standard investigates not the legislative process, but rather the adjudicative process, when a specific landowner has
petitioned for a decision to determine whether the decisions made during that
process were in fact legislative based.
192. See Crymes v. Dekalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam); Moore v. Trippe, 743 F. Supp. 201, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). When
considering the fact prong of the fact/impact standard, both of these courts refrained from using the terms "legislative" and "administrative" facts. In Crymes,
the court described the fact/impact test in the following manner: "If the facts
utilized in making a decision are specific, rather than general, in nature, then the
[I]f the decision impacts specific indidecision is more likely administrative ....
viduals, rather than the general population, it is more apt to be administrative in
nature." Crymes, 923 F.2d at 1485. The district court in Moore stated it would
not provide legislative immunity "if the factors considered in adopting the legislation relate to specific individuals, instead of general policy implications."
Moore, 743 F. Supp. at 207.
193. See Crymes, 923 F.2d at 1485. In Crymes, a property owner brought a
§ 1983 action against the county and its commissioners after they denied his
application for a development permit. Crymes, 923 F.2d at 1483-84. Crymes
sought to operate a solid waste landfill on his property. Id. at 1483. While the
Board of Commissioners approved Crymes' application, the associate director of
Public-Works-Development withheld approval. Id. at 1484. The director withheld approval because the roads surrounding the proposed landfill would need
to be improved. Id. The director conditioned approval on the requirement that
Crymes donate some of his property for public use without compensation. Id.
The court held that the defendants' decision to deny Crymes' permit application
could not be protected by absolute immunity because it was directed specifically
at Crymes. Id. at 1486. The Crymes court applied the enact/fact standard in the
following manner:
[T]he vote of the Board of Commissioners to remove Pleasant Hill
Road from the list of truck routes was probably legislative in nature.
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other decision considered each component of the two standards but did
194
not determine which component was controlling.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York discussed
the enact/fact standard in Moore v. Trippe. 195 Moore involved a suit by a
religious organization, Wellspring Zendor, Inc. (Wellspring), against the
Town of Pound Ridge and its officials.19 6 Wellspring constructed a temple on nineteen acres of property it owned after obtaining a building
permit.19 7 Neighbors of Wellspring complained to town officials about
Wellspring's activities on the land. 19 8 Specifically, Wellspring was cutting down trees, creating beams and blasting.19 9 Wellspring also placed
over two hundred "No Trespassing" signs on the property and secured
it with guards. 200 Subsequently, the Town Board enacted an amendment to the Town Code which provided that site plan approval by the
Planning Board was required before a property owner could construct
or modify a building on the premises. 20 1 In addition, the amendment
stated that a property owner could not: "remove, relocate, alter, or
enlarge any existing stonewall, pond, wetland, natural soil grade or
other existing topographical feature, including stands of trees or vegetation in excess of three (3) feet in height and within seventy-five feet of
any property line without prior site plan approval." ' 20 2 In seeking damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, Wellspring alleged that the
amendment violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under
the Constitution and its analogous rights under the New York
Constitution.

20 3

That action, however, did not apply to Crymes. Rather, Crymes' complaint focuses on the Board's decision to uphold the denial of the development permit for Crymes' property on the ground that
surrounding roads were in need of improvement. The decision to deny
Crymes' application is the application of policy to a specific party....
Therefore ....the complaint stated sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss on absolute immunity grounds.
Id. As is evident from the above quotation, the Crymes court did not articulate
how it applied the prongs of the enact/fact standard.
194. See Moore, 743 F. Supp. at 207. The court in Moore found that "local
legislative immunity may be lost if the actions taken impact on particular individuals, rather than on a community generally." Id. Legislative immunity will also
be "lost" if the action is directed at specific individuals rather than based upon
considerations of general policy. Id. The Moore court also held that if legislators
go beyond adopting legislation and into enforcement, legislative immunity will
also be lost. Id.
195. 743 F. Supp. 201, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
196. Id. at 203.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 204.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 204 n.5.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 206. The plaintiffs moved for class certification. Id. at 205. The
defendants moved to dismiss the action on a number of grounds, including the
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The Moore court concluded that it could not determine on the
pleadings alone whether the defendant officials' enactment of the
amendment was a legislative act or an executive act because "with a local
board it is often difficult to differentiate between legislative and executive action." 20 4 The court explained that to characterize the officials'
act, the court needed to know whether the act would only affect Wellspring, and what the Board considered in making its decision. 20 5 The
court indicated that the board members would not be entitled to absolute immunity under the fact/impact standard if the act of the Town
Board members affected only Wellspring, and if the members considered only "whether they could stop plaintiffs from continuing their practices." '20 6 The court also noted that the Town Board members would
not be afforded absolute immunity under the rule enactment standard if
they, along with the town attorney and Building Inspector, engaged in
20 7
enforcement activities.
Under Moore, it is unclear how a court espousing the enact/fact
standard will reach a determination as to whether an act is legislative or
administrative in those cases in which the act is legislative under one
prong of the test and yet is administrative under the other prong of the
test.
5.

The "Legislative Fact Standard"." Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish

Only the Fifth Circuit has applied a legislative fact standard to characterize official acts. 20 8 Under such a standard, the court considers the
argument that the members of the Town Board should be entitled to absolute
immunity with respect to their adoption of the amendment to the Town Code.
Id.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id. (hypothesizing that if "the Town Board members engaged in en-

forcement efforts in conjunction with the Town Attorney and the Building Inspector, absolute immunity may . . . be forfeited").

208. See Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish, 937 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1991)
(examining nature of function when characterizing action of local official), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 939 (1992); Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475,
479 (5th Cir.) (determining characterization of zoning decision for purposes of
judicial review), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986);
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1981)
("[L]ocal legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from suit under section
1983 for conduct in the furtherance of their duties."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907
(1982); Dunmore v. City of Natchez, 703 F. Supp. 31, 32 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (as-

serting that scope of immunity determined by type of act for which immunity is
claimed).
The Fifth Circuit's holdings in Calhoun and Shelton overturned a line of cases
dating back to 1977. Calhoun, 937 F.2d at 174 (stating that Fifth Circuit "put
Bayou Landing and its progeny to rest" with its holding in Shelton); cf Bayou
Landing, Ltd. v. Watts, 563 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1977) (determining that
resolution directed at single business rather than generally applicable to entire
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type of official who acted and the character of the act performed. 20 9 In
addition, the court examines whether the defendant officials based their
act on legislative facts. 2 10 Thus, if the act were performed by elected
officials pursuant to a legislative judgment that in turn was based on
legislative facts, the official act would be characterized as legislative. 2 1'
In Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish,2 12 the plaintiff, Calhoun, proposed

to build low to moderate income housing on his property. 2 13 His plans,
however, were temporarily halted by an interim moratorium passed by
the Police Jurors of the Parish affecting an area of land within which
Calhoun's parcel was located. 2 14 Calhoun alleged that immediately
prior to the moratorium enactment, he approached one of the Police
Jurors to discuss his project, during which time the juror proceeded to
' 2 15
"denunciate[] minorities and low to moderate income housing.
2
16
Nevertheless, Calhoun submitted a building permit application.
After a prolonged delay, the Parish finally issued Calhoun his building permit, limiting its use to housing for the elderly. 21 7 Calhoun subsequently
filed suit against the Police Jurors under section 1983 and the Takings
community is highly suspect), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1978), overruled by Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish, 937 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1991).
Calhoun, Shelton and Dunmore seemingly run afoul of Minton v. St. Bernard
Parish Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1986). In Minton, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case, requiring the district court to consider whether the defendant
officials were engaged in establishing public policy (a legislative act) or applying
existing policy (an administrative act). Id. at 133-36. Although courts bound by
Fifth Circuit precedent have not explicitly overruled Minton, they seem to have
subsequently ignored the standard set in Minton requiring that a court label the
application of existing policy as an administrative act. For example, in Dunmore,
the district court held that legislative immunity attaches to officials when they
deny a request for a zoning variance. Dunmore, 703 F. Supp. at 32. Such an act
invariably is an application of policy to a specific individual. Minton may be distinguishable, however, because it is not a land use case. For a further discussion
of Minton, see supra note 126.

209. Dunmore, 703 F. Supp. at 32 (holding that granting of variances is legislative act entitled to absolute immunity); see also Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1194
(holding that mayoral veto is legislative act because "it constitutes the policymaking decision of an individual elected official").
210. Calhoun, 937 F.2d at 172, 174 (determining that spot zoning is legisla-

tive judgment because of its review of legislative facts).
211. Id. at 174 (holding that police jurors are entitled to legislative immunity); see also Dunmore, 703 F. Supp. at 33 (determining that elected or appointed

officials acting within scope of their duties are entitled to legislative immunity).
212. 937 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 939 (1992).
213. Id. at 173.

214. Id. The Calhoun court noted that the moratorium enacted at that time
was the first moratorium ever enacted by the Police Jurors. Id. The public record did not discuss the Police Jurors' reasons for passing the moratorium. Id.
215. Id.

216. Id. While Calhoun's permit application was under consideration, two
more moratoria were enacted by the Police Jurors. Id.
217. Id. The plaintiff subsequently attempted to have his permit revised,
but his efforts failed. Id.
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 2 18 The Police Jurors moved to dismiss
the action on the grounds that they were entitled to absolute or qualified
immunity. 2 19 The issue before the court was whether the Police Jurors'
"spot zoning" of Calhoun's property was a legislative or administrative
act.

220

Initially, the Calhoun court reaffirmed its rejection of the line-drawing characterization standard used by other courts that seeks to classify
an ordinance as general or particularized. 2 2' Using its own characterization test, the court purported to examine whether the challenged official
act involved a consideration of legislative facts. 2 22 The court then held
that spot zoning is a legislative act entitled to absolute immunity, despite
the fact that it is an action taken against specific individuals and is "not
the initial enactment of a zoning code."' 223 Interestingly, courts in other
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have determined that "particularized" official decisions, such as denying a variance, are administrative and not legislative acts, and are therefore entitled only to
qualified immunity.

2 24

218. Id.
219. Id. The Calhoun court stated that the district court in which the suit
was brought dismissed the defendants' motion. Id.
220. Id. at 174. "Spot zoning" is an unofficial phrase that refers to "a zoning map amendment that is perceived to be arbitrary because it confers a zoning
'favor' on a single landowner without justification." MANDELKER, supra note 3, at
158. Spot zoning is a single-tract zoning map amendment. Id. at 157. The general function of a map amendment is to change zoning regulations so as to reclassify particular property. Id.
The denying of a variance under the legislative fact standard would also be
considered legislative. See Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 480
(5th Cir.) (finding that "[nlothing internal to the legislative model impedes its
application to a specific zoning decision"), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, and cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986). Under the rule enactment standard, however, the
granting or denying of a variance to zoning regulations would be an administrative and not a legislative act. See, e.g., Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d
680, 693 n.60 (3d Cir. 1980) ("An example of an administrative act would be the
denial of a variance, because such an act involves not only general policy considerations but also application of that policy to an individual landowner."), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
A variance is an "authorization for the construction or maintenance of a
building or structure, or for the establishment or maintenance of a use of land,
which is prohibited by a zoning enactment." 82 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning
§ 255 (1976). The purpose of a variance is "to correct maladjustments and inequities, and to render justice in individual cases, and each application for a
variance must be considered on its own facts and merits." Id. § 266. From this
definition, it is evident why the rule enactment standard would characterize the
granting or denying of a zoning variance as an administrative act: it involves
applying established land use policy to a specific landowner.
221. Calhoun, 937 F.2d at 174 (citing Shelton, 780 F.2d at 480).
222. Id.
223. Id. (holding that spot zoning is legislative in nature even though it did
not involve enactment of zoning law).
224. See, e.g., Rogin, 616 F.2d at 693 n.60 (asserting that denial of zoning
variance would be administrative act because it "involves not only general policy
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The view of the Fifth Circuit is problematic because it ends its characterization analysis at whether or not legislative facts (i.e., policy) constituted the basis for the official act. If that point were the end of the
inquiry, officials could bring themselves within legislative immunity simply by indicating that their decision was policy-based, regardless of
whether the policy was being enforced or enacted and whether the policy was being formulated or had already been established. At this time,
it is unclear whether the broad reasoning supporting the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Calhoun is limited to "spot zoning" cases.
6.

The "Legislative Process Standard": Hansen v. Bennett

The decisions of federal courts in this category do not articulate a
clearly defined characterization standard. 2 25 Rather, to characterize a
challenged official act, these courts examine the nature of the act to determine if the act had been traditionally characterized as part of the legislative process. 22 6 The holdings in these cases tend to be very narrow,
considerations but also application of the policy to an individual landowner");
Jodeco, Inc. v. Hann, 674 F. Supp. 488, 496 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that ruling
on variance application is administrative act because it "impacted no one other
than the plaintiff").
225. See Hansen v. Bennett, 948 F.2d 397, 402-03 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that mayor removing municipal citizen from city council meeting is not legislative act because legislative business was not being conducted at meeting); Gross
v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165, 170-74 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that personnel decision by councilmember was made while acting in administrative capacity);
Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that budget decision eliminating positions of city employees was legislative).
226. Rateree, 852 F.2d at 950 (asserting that certain decisions of local officials are not administrative if made through traditional legislative functions); see
also Gross, 876 F.2d at 172 (basing holding on Supreme Court decision in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), which applied functional approach to action of state court judge).
Examining the district court opinions for Rateree and Gross may be helpful in
understanding the standard impliedly endorsed by the circuit court opinions. In
the district court opinion of Rateree, city employees sued the city and its commissioners for wrongful termination. Rateree v. Rockett, 630 F. Supp. 763, 768
(N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988). The city commission had
passed a budget ordinance that eliminated funding for the plaintiffs' positions.
Id. at 767. The plaintiffs argued that characterization of the official act should be
determined by the rule enactment standard, resulting in the classification of the
defendants acts as administrative. Id. at 770. The district court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument, relying on a case that stated that the type of act at issue was
traditionally a legislative act "reflecting policy objectives." Id. at 770-71 (quoting
Goldberg v. Village of Spring Valley, 538 F. Supp. 646, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
The court found that while this "analysis is somewhat conclusory," it is nevertheless applicable to the case at bar. Id. at 771. Rateree was not a land use case,
but instead involved a city's elimination of city jobs. Id. at 767. The court held
that the city officials who terminated the plaintiffs' employment were protected
by legislative immunity. Id. at 772. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision. Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir. 1988), affrg 630
F. Supp. 763 (N.D. 111. 1986).

In Gross v. Winter, after reviewing relevant federal common law, the district
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limiting the grant of immunity to the particular function at issue because
"immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves,
not by the person to whom it attaches."'2 27 For example, one court
stated: "political decision making ...

strikes at the heart of the legisla-

'2 28
tive process and [therefore] is protected legislative conduct."
Hansen v. Bennett, 229 though not a land use case, is illustrative of the
legislative process standard. In Hansen, the mayor ordered the police
chief to remove a citizen from a city council meeting for creating a disturbance during the meeting. 230 Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the
mayor and the police chief for violating his First Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution. 2 3 1 The mayor and police chief
moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that they were entitled to absolute or qualified immunity.2 3 2 The Hansen court purported
to use the functional approach developed by the Supreme Court in For-

court noted that "[t]he cases uniformly allow local legislators absolute immunity
when they perform traditional legislative functions such as the enactment of legislation or committee investigation." Gross v. Winter, 692 F. Supp. 1420, 1425
(D.D.C. 1988), aft'd, 876 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The action in Gross was
brought against the defendant after she fired the plaintiff council member. Id. at
1421-22. The district court stated that the defendant was engaging in an administrative function because she was not enacting legislation or participating in a
committee investigation when dealing with her staff. Id. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding, not expressly on the grounds set forth by the lower court, but instead by analogy to
Forrester. See Gross v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165, 172 (7th Cir. 1988), afg 692 F.
Supp. 1420 (D.D.C. 1988).
Although both Rateree and Gross involved job eliminations, the two cases can
be distinguished from each other. In Rateree, the plaintiffs' positions were eliminated from the city budget (a policy decision), and in Gross, the plaintiff was fired
(an administrative decision). See Rateree, 852 F.2d at 950; Gross, 876 F.2d at 166.
The court in Rateree stated that "[a]lmost all budget decisions have an effect on
employment... [but] [t]his reality ... does not transform a uniquely legislative
function into an administrative one." Rateree, 852 F.2d at 950.
227. Gross, 876 F.2d at 170 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227
(1978)); see also Hansen, 948 F.2d at 403 (narrow holding of decision emphasized
by court); Rateree, 852 F.2d at 950 (holding that budget decisions are legislative
in nature, and, therefore, officials making such decisions are entitled to absolute
immunity).
228. Rateree, 852 F.2d at 950-51.
229. 948 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1991).
230. Id. at 398. The plaintiff "ha[d] long been a political gadfly of" the
mayor. Id.
231. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff brought claims in addition to his
First Amendment claim discussed in the case, but the court did not list what the
plaintiff's other claims were. Id. at 398 n.1.
232. Id. The court dismissed the qualified immunity claim because deciding whether the defendants can be afforded qualified immunity necessitates a
determination of a question of fact. Id. at 399. However, because deciding
whether the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity is a question of law,
the court was able to address this issue. Id.
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rester v. White23 3 to characterize the acts of the mayor and the police
chief. 23 4

Instead of making an independent determination as to the

function of the mayor and the police chief at the meeting, the Hansen
court turned to the facts of specific Supreme Court cases and observed
that the Court has extended legislative immunity to legislators "only
when they were voting on a resolution, speaking on legislation or in a
legislative hearing, or subpoenaing records for use in a legislative hearing." 23 5 After determining which of these legislative acts occurred at
the meeting, the Hansen court held that the mayor was not entitled to
absolute immunity because the portion of the meeting in which the
mayor removed the plaintiff was not legislative. 23 6 The court stated that
at the time the plaintiff was ejected from the meeting, the meeting was
open to the general public and "citizens were not limited to discussing
legislative issues, and the aldermen were not considering any legislation
23 7
or investigating any legislation.,
The flaw in the decisions that embrace a legislative process standard
is that they fail to provide a mechanism for determining the nature of
the official act in question. Evident from the Hansen decision is that a
court must investigate how courts have historically characterized the act
at issue in order to apply this standard. 23 8 If no prior case has characterized an act similar to the challenged act, a plaintiff can only hypothesize how the court will characterize the act in his or her own suit. For
233. 484 U.S. 219 (1988). For a list of other Supreme Court cases articulating the functional approach, see supra note 7.
234. Hansen, 948 F.2d at 401.
235. Id. (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (voting on resolution)); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (subpoenaing records for
use in legislative hearing); United States v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966) (speaking on legislation); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (speaking at legislative hearing); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (voting on
resolution)).
236. Id. at 403. The court pointed out that it "would be a different case if
the city council meeting had been a purely legislative session." Id. The court
illustrated that if Hansen "disrupted the city council.., while its members were
voting on legislation, debating legislation among themselves, or holding a legislative hearing or investigation ....

[the mayor] might well be entitled to absolute

immunity for ejecting him." Id.
237. Id. at 402. Hansen came to the meeting to discuss an environmental
matter. Id. at 398. The court noted that this environmental matter was not legislative because Hansen only wished for the mayor to disclose information concerning a particular site and to read a letter publicly from the Federal Superfund
Program. Id. at 402 n.13. The court determined that "[c]ommunication by a
legislator to his or her constituents is not legislative activity for purposes of legislative immunity." Id. at 402 (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 13033 (1979)).
238. For a discussion of characterization of the official act in question, see
Zoning, supra note 3, at 1509. The article states that these courts "simply classify
some types of zoning decisions, such as the adoption of a comprehensive plan,
as legislative acts, while characterizing other decisions, such as the granting of
zoning variances, as administrative." Id.
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example, under both the legislative process and rule enactment standards, enacting a zoning ordinance, acknowledging land use plans,
adopting an amendment to a zoning ordinance as well as a mayoral veto
would be characterized as legislative acts. Only the rule enactment standard, however, defines a "legislative act" so that courts have grounds for
making the above conclusions and have guidance for making future
23 9
decisions.
Given the various characterization standards that courts employ, the
remaining sections of this Note will evaluate the rule enactment standard as it has been applied by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This Note will focus specifically on Zamsky v. Hansell,240 in which
the Ninth Circuit expanded the elements of this standard. After a presentation of the facts of Zamsky, this Note will describe how the Ninth
Circuit has modified the rule enactment standard. In conclusion, this
Note will discuss why the Ninth Circuit's modification is unjustified.
III.

DISCUSSION OF ZAMSKY V. HANSELL

In Zamsky v. Hansell, the plaintiff, Zamsky, owned 1,950 acres of undeveloped land in Klamath County, Oregon.2 4 1 The County rezoned
Zamsky's land pursuant to a continuance order from the Oregon Land
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) which required
the county to bring its comprehensive plan into compliance with the
LCDC's statewide goals. 2 4 2 This rezoning dropped the value of Zamsky's undeveloped land from $3,500,000 before the rezoning to
$200,000 after the rezoning. 243 Subsequently, Zamsky filed a section
1983 action against the Director of the LCDC and the LCDC Commissioners in their individual capacities, alleging that these officials had violated his constitutional rights under the Due Process, Equal Protection
and Takings Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
239. For a critique of the Ninth Circuit's conclusions on characterizing
these land use decisions, see Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 685-87 (9th Cir.
1991) (Alarcon, J., dissenting). For the conclusions of courts utilizing a rule
enactment standard on characterizing these land use decisions, see Haskell v.
Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1278 (6th Cir. 1988) (enacting zoning
ordinance); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir.
1981) (mayoral veto), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980) (passing amendments to zoning ordinance), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
240. 933 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
241. Id. at 678.
242. Id. For a discussion of Oregon's statutory scheme, see infra notes 249-

53 and accompanying text.

243. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 678. Zamsky's property had previously been

zoned for building not more than one dwelling per five acres. Id. at 682 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). In response to the LCDC's continuance order, the county

rezoned an area that included Zamskys property to a minimum of one dwelling
per 20 acres. Id. at 685 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

45

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 5

708

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 663

Constitution. 244 Zamsky argued that the LCDC could not require a rezoning of his property because it had already acknowledged his proposed development a few years previously. 24 5 At trial, the magistrate
granted the LCDC officials' motion for summary judgment, finding that
the officials had been acting in a legislative capacity when they ruled on
whether the county's comprehensive plan complied with the LCDC's
land use goals. 2 46 The trial court held, therefore, that the LCDC officials were absolutely immune from liability in Zamsky's suit against
them.

24 7

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit posited the issue before the court in
the following manner: "Are state officials who unconstitutionally cause
land to be rezoned absolutely immune from liability for the damage
caused by their unlawful conduct?" 248 Before addressing this issue, the
majority first noted that Oregon utilizes a comprehensive plan system
for enacting its land use laws. 24 9 In Oregon, the LCDC adopts land use
244. Id. (Alarcon,J., dissenting). Zamsky filed the § 1983 action on Decem-

ber 31, 1986. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). The rezoning of his land took place

in 1984. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). He asserted that the LCDC had singled
out his property and demanded that the local legislators rezone his property in
order to render it virtually worthless. Id. at 679.
245. Id. The LCDC acknowledged the plaintiff's proposed development in
1982, which was two years prior to Klamath County's rezoning of his land. Id.
Zamsky claimed that because the LCDC had already acknowledged this proposed development, it was precluded from a second review of his property
under Oregon's administrative rules. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 678. The Zamsky opinion does not reveal whether Zamsky sued
Klamath County and its officials as well as the LCDC Commissioners for consti-

tutional violations. Zamsky could not have sued the LCDC itself because it is a
state entity protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
bars § 1983 claim against state unless state has waived its immunity or Congress
has exercised its power under § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment to override state's
immunity). Zamsky also might not have been able to bring an action against
Klamath County because the county also may be protected by the Eleventh
Amendment if it is determined that it is acting as an arm of the state. See Mount
Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (determining
that if local governmental entity is treated under state law as "arm of the State,"
it is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity). However, there probably
would be no bar against Zamsky bringing a § 1983 action against Klamath
County officials. For a discussion of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, see supra note 6.
249. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 680. For a general discussion of comprehensive
plans, see supra note 18. The following excerpt from the majority opinion describes Oregon's statutory scheme for giving land use plans the force of law:
The Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission has
two primary functions. First, it adopts "goals" which become the
mandatory state-wide planning standards with which all local land use
plans must comply. It also reviews the comprehensive land use plans
which local governments are required to create and adopt for conformity with the state-wide goals. A local land use plan becomes effective if
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goals which serve as the planning standards for the entire state.2 50 Each
county submits its comprehensive plan to the LCDC to be reviewed for
compliance with the statewide goals. 25 1 If the LCDC acknowledges that
the plan meets its goals, the plan becomes effective as law. 25 2 Otherand only if the LCDC "acknowledges" that it meets the state-wide
goals. If the plan does not conform with the state-wide goals, the
LCDC may issue a continuance order and explain how to bring the plan
into compliance.
Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 678 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.015(1), (8), 197.040(1)(c),
(2)(d), 197.175(2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), 197.251(12) (1989)). Compare this interpre-

tation of the statute with the dissent's view. For a statement of the dissent's
view, see infra notes 267-79 and accompanying text.
Under the Oregon statute, "the commission shall adopt goals and guidelines for use by state agencies, local governments and special districts in preparing, adopting, amending and implementing existing and future comprehensive
plans." OR. REV. STAT. § 197.225 (1991). With respect to whether a local government's comprehensive plan complies with adopted statewide goals, the statute states:
(1) Upon the request of a local government, the commission shall
by order grant, deny or continue acknowledgment of compliance with
the goals....
(2) In accordance with rules of the commission, the director shall
prepare a report for the commission stating whether the comprehen-

sive plan and land use regulations for which acknowledgment is sought
are in compliance with the goals. The rules of the commission shall:
(a) Provide a reasonable opportunity for persons to prepare
and to submit to the director written comments and objections to
the acknowledgment requests; and
(b) Authorize the director to investigate and in the report to
resolve issues raised in the comments and objections or by the director's own review of the comprehensive plan and land use
regulations.
(5) A commission order granting, denying or continuing acknowledgment shall include a clear statement of findings which sets forth the
basis for the approval, denial or continuance of acknowledgment. The
findings shall:
(a) Identify the goals with which the comprehensive plan and
land use regulations comply and those with which they do not comply; and
(b) Include a clear statement of findings in support of the determinations of compliance and noncompliance.
(6) A commission order granting acknowledgment shall be limited
to an identifiable geographic area described in the order if:
(a) Only the identified geographic area is the subject of the
acknowledgment request; or
(b) Specific geographic areas do not comply with the goals,
and the goal requirements are not technical or minor in nature.
(7) The commission may issue a limited acknowledgment order
only in the circumstances identified in subsection (6) of this section
Id. § 197.251.
250. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 678.
251. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.175(2)(a), 197.040(2)(d) (1989)).
252. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.015(1), 197.175(2)(c), (2)(d) (1989)).
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wise, the LCDC may issue a continuance order permitting the county to
bring the plan into compliance. If the LCDC does issue the order, it
which parts
must point out which parts of the county's plan did comply,
253
did not comply and which areas of land are affected.
After reviewing this system, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision and held that the Director and Commissioners of the
LCDC had acted in an executive capacity and not in either a legislative
or judicial capacity when they ruled on the county's comprehensive
plan. 25 4 To support its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that the officials were monitoring compliance with the laws and regulations previously established in the LCDC land use goals and were offering
suggestions on how compliance could be achieved. 25 5 Such action was
executive according to the court, because it involved ad hoc discretion2 56
ary decisionmaking.
In reaching its decision, the majority in Zamisky purported to follow
the precedent established by the Ninth Circuit in Cinevision Corp. v. City of
Burbank.2 57 In Cinevision, the Ninth Circuit held that monitoring and administering a contract between the city council and a concert promoter
was an administrative act. 25 8 Analogizing to Cinevision, the Zamsky court
concluded that the LCDC officials were simply monitoring Klamath
County's comprehensive plan for compliance with established statewide
goals.2

59

In further support of its conclusion, the court found that the

officials had acted against a specific individual in enforcing the LCDC's
253. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 197.251(12) (1989)).
254. Id. at 679. The court suggested that the acts of enacting a master plan
or confirming local plans to give them the force of law would be legislative. Id.
However, because Zamsky did not sue the LCDC officials on either of these
grounds, the court did not pursue those issues further. Id. Zamsky alleged that
the actions of the officials singled out his property. Id.
255. Id. at 680. The court noted that this case closely resembled Cinevision

Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054
(1985). Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679. In Cinevision, the court held that the administration and monitoring compliance with a contract was an executive functiou.
Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580. In Zamsky, the court found that both monitoring
compliance with a contract and monitoring compliance with statewide planning
goals involved "ad hoc decision-making," an executive function, rather than
"formulation of policy," a legislative function. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679.
256. Id. (holding that offering recommendations on how to comply with law
is executive function).
257. 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
258. Id. at 579-80. The Cinevision court held:
[T]he City Council was simply monitoring and administering the contract by voting on the various proposed concerts. Administration of a
municipal contract-a contract between a private party and a municipality-would generally seem to be an executive function.... Administration of a contract does not involve the formulation of policy "as a
defined and binding rule of conduct." Rather, it is more the type of ad
hoc decisionmaking engaged in by an executive.
Id. at 580 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
259. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679.
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land use goals. 260 The court noted that the officials' act would have
been entitled to legislative immunity if the act had only involved the
formulation of policy. 26 1 Because the officials had acted in an executive
capacity, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a
determination as to whether the officials' act could pass the qualified
26 2
immunity test.
Had Zamsky brought suit on other grounds, the court might have
entitled the LCDC officials to absolute immunity protection. For example, the court noted that had Zamsky sued the LCDC officials for adopting statewide planning goals, the act of adopting such a plan would have
been characterized as legislative, affording the officials absolute immunity. 26 3 Similarly, if the officials had been sued for confirming local land
use plans, the court stated that it "might" have characterized such an act
264
as legislative.
The Zamsky majority also rejected a judicial characterization of the
LCDC officials' act. 2 6 5 The majority stated that the act was not made in
a judicial capacity because: (1) the proceedings during which the act
took place were not adversarial; (2) the officials made recommendations
on how to bring the plan into compliance (an executive function); and
(3) the officials had the combined role of acting as legislators and administrators, which are functions inconsistent with acting in a judicial
266
capacity.
260. Id. ("Zamsky sued the LCDC for singling out his property and demanding that the local legislature amend its plan so as to make Zamsky's property virtually worthless.").
261. Id. The court in Zamsky determined that:
Monitoring compliance with established laws or regulations and offering recommendations on how compliance may be achieved is an executive function involving "ad hoc decisionmaking" rather than
"formulation of policy.". . . Because the LCDC Commissioners and
staff member Ross acted in an executive function in suggesting or demanding changes to local plans, they are not entitled to absolute
immunity.
Id. (citing Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580).
262. Id. at 680 (finding that in ruling on whether proposed plan complied
with statewide planning standards, LCDC officials were not exercising legislative
judgment). For a discussion of the "qualified immunity test," see supra notes 5567 and accompanying text.
263. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679. The LCDC argued that the enactment of a
general zoning ordinance is a legislative act and is therefore entitled to legislative immunity. Id. However, Zamsky was not suing the LCDC for enacting legislation, but for singling out his property when recommending changes to the

proposed local land use plan. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. The court stated that the officials "are the same individuals who
promulgate the 'goals' in the first place . . . combin[ing] the functions of

lawmaker and monitor of compliance... which are not uncommon at the local
level, but they are inconsistent with the judicial role and judicial immunity." Id.
See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1985) (holding that prison
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The Zamsky dissent argued that LCDC officials were acting in a legislative capacity and should be afforded absolute immunity. 26 7 The dissent claimed that the majority failed to consider the nature of the LCDC
officials' act within the context of the state of Oregon's comprehensive
plan system of enacting land use laws. 2 68 The dissent argued that the
LCDC officials' function of monitoring compliance was part of the legislative process required by the Oregon statutory code. 2 69 Because the
officials only acted within their statutory authority to promulgate zoning
regulations, the dissent argued that the officials' acts could not be labelled as administrative. 2 70 To support this argument, the dissent
pointed out that under the Oregon statute, the LCDC officials were
given the power to "acknowledge" a local comprehensive plan and give
it the force of law. 2 7 ' Therefore, because the officials had the power to
acknowledge a local plan, they likewise could have refused to give the
plan the force of law. 2 72 Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in
guards serving as disciplinary board members are not entitled to absolute immunity); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978) (stating that extensive
safeguards are built into process of administrative agency adjudication to ensure
that administrative law judges exercise independent judgment); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975) (holding that school board members function
as both legislators and adjudicators in disciplinary process and are not entitled
to absolute immunity).
267. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 685 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (stating that court must consider
function of LCDC in acknowledging comprehensive land use plan).
269. Id. at 684 (Alarcon,J., dissenting). Under the Oregon Comprehensive
Land Use Planning Act, the LCDC officials must review, adopt and amend comprehensive land use plans promulgated by local governments if they are in compliance with the law. Id. at 685 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.040(2)(a),
197.251(1) (1989)). These land use plans do not have the force of law until they
are acknowledged by the LCDC. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 197.175(2)(c)
(1989)). The LCDC's role in this process is similar to that of the President or a
governor when signing or vetoing proposed legislation. Id. This function has
long been recognized as a legislative function entitled to absolute immunity. Id.
(citing Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 490 (1932) (holding that "President's function in approving or disapproving bills" is legislative function)).
270. Id. at 680-81 (Alarcon,J., dissenting). The dissent outlined the "legislative process" required by the Oregon statutory code:
[First,] the Director of Land Conservation and Development must prepare a report for consideration by the LCDC analyzing the comprehensive plan's compliance with the goals .... Interested persons must be

provided a reasonable opportunity to present comments and objections
for the Director's consideration ....

Before the Director submits the

report to the LCDC, he must allow local governments and persons who
submitted written comments or objections an opportunity to file written exceptions to the report.
Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 685 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon stated:
The LCDC's acknowledgement of a local government's land-use plans,
giving them the force of law, is a legislative function. An acknowledgment constitutes "the formulation and promulgation of legislative pol-
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Edwards v. United States,2 73 in which the Court held that an executive veto
is a legislative function, 2 74 the dissent argued that the LCDC's act of
issuing a continuance order was equivalent to vetoing parts of the local
plan. 275 The'dissent concluded, therefore, that this act should be characterized as legislative, entitling the LCDC officials to absolute
2 76
immunity.
The dissent further argued that the majority's opinion did not follow the precedent set forth in Cinevision in which the Ninth Circuit
adopted a functional approach for deciding immunity issues. 2 77 The
Cinevision court had explicitly rejected a rule employed by other federal
courts that examined whether specific individuals were affected by the
challenged official act. 2 78 The dissent accused the majority of giving life
icy as a defined and binding rule of conduct.".. . A corollary power to
the acknowledgement power is the power to veto local legislation and
thereby prevent it from having any legal effect.
Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944)).
273. 286 U.S. 482 (1932).
274. Id. at 490.
275. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 685 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon determined:
The LCDC exercises its "veto" power either in the form of a denial or
continuance order. Zamsky has challenged the LCDC's exercise of this
function. The Supreme Court instructed in Lake Country Estates ... that

to the extent that the agency members act in a legislative capacity, they
are entitled to absolute immunity.
Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979)).
277. Id. at 687-88; see also Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d
560, 577-81 (9th Cir. 1984) ("In deciding whether an act is legislative we must
look at the nature of the act rather than simply at ... their particular location
within the government."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985). By stating that the

correct characterization standard to be used is the "functional approach," the
dissent did not resolve the issue of what kind of standard a court should apply to

determine which function the officials were performing when they acted. It is
otherwise well settled that a functional approach must be taken to determine
whether the official is to be afforded § 1983 immunity. See, e.g., Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (asserting that Court uses functional approach
to decide whether immunity is to be afforded to an official); Hansen v. Bennett,
948 F.2d 397, 400-04 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that when determining whether
local official's action is entitled to absolute immunity, court is to look only at
function local official was performing at time of such action); Crymes v. Dekalb
County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (1 th Cir. 1991) (same; quoting Espanola Way
Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1039 (1983)); Gross v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[I]mmunity
is justified and defined by the functions it protects... not by the person to whom
it attaches.").
278. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 686-87 (Alarcon, J., dissenting); see also Cinevision,
745 F.2d at 579. In Cinevision, the court found that "[slome courts attempting to
distinguish executive and legislative acts by local legislators have done so by
scrutinizing the scope of the act: an act that applies generally to the community
is a legislative one, while an act directed at one or a few individuals is an executive one." Id. The court rejected this view by stating that "[a]lthough this dis-
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279

ANALYSIS OF ZAMSKY

v. HANSELL

The dispute between the majority and dissent in Zamsky reflects a
fundamental difference in the interpretation and application of the
Ninth Circuit's rule enactment characterization standard. This section
of the Note discusses the rule enactment standard by comparing the majority's expansive interpretation with the dissent's criticism of such an
interpretation. This Note concludes that the Zamsky majority unjustifiably expanded the meaning of "executive act" beyond the scope of the
rule enactment standard as defined by prior precedent. This Note also
concludes that the Zamsky majority was incorrect in holding that the defendant officials acted in an executive capacity when issuing their continuance order to Klamath County and making recommendations as to how
Klamath County could comply with its statewide land use goals. This
Note concurs with the dissent's conclusion that the LCDC Commissioners acted in a legislative capacity. Unlike the dissent, however, this Note
finds that the defendant officials' action of issuing the continuance order
was a legislative act because it was analogous to a formulation of policy,
which is a legislative act under a more conservative interpretation of the
rule enactment standard.
A.

Expansion of the Ninth Circuit's CharacterizationStandard by the Majority

Despite the majority's expansion of the rule enactment standard, in
some respects, the holding and reasoning of the majority in Zansky is
illustrative of the rule enactment test.2 80 Zamsky sued the LCDC officials for "singling out his property and demanding that the local legislature amend its plan so as to make . . . [his] property virtually
worthless." ' 28 1 The majority accepted Zamsky's argument. In essence,
the court concluded that by issuing a continuance order, the LCDC officials were enforcing the county's comprehensive plan by monitoring the
local plan's compliance with established statewide goals and making recommendations as to how compliance might be achieved.2 8 2 The majortinction may at times be useful, it does not always provide an answer to the
question." Id.
279. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon asserted that "[w]e declined [in Cinevision], however, to adopt the rule suggested
by Zamsky ... that would define an executive act as 'an act directed at one or a
few individuals.' " Id. (quoting Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 579).
280. For a discussion of the traditional rule enactment standard, see supra
notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
281. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679.

282. See id. The majority in Zamsky did not label the actions of the LCDC
officials as enforcing its land use goals rather than enacting them. Nevertheless,
this terminology can be applied to the majority's reasoning, given that this ter-

minology has been used in prior precedent of the Ninth Circuit. See Cinevision,
745 F.2d at 577-78 (noting that enactment of general zoning ordinance is legis-
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ity felt that these acts did not comprise policy-making or plan
enactment, but instead reflected the ad hoc decision-making of the
283
executive.
The Ninth Circuit's decisions, including Zamsky, uniquely articulate
the components of the rule enactment standard. To define the enactment prong, the Ninth Circuit had utilized the Supreme Court's statement in Yakus v. United States.2 8 4 There, the Court stated: "The
essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.''285 Considering the Supreme Court's statement
alone, it is unclear whether an act is considered legislative if it is based
solely on a policy determination, or whether it must include both a policy
determination and a formulation of that policy into rules of conduct. In
interpreting this statement, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that legislative acts involve "the formulation of policy 'as a defined and binding
rule of conduct.' ",286
lative act and enforcement of general zoning ordinance against specific individual is executive act (citing Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345,
1349 (9th Cir. 1982)). This Note asserts that even though Zamsky does not utilize the terms "enactment" and "enforcement" to distinguish between legislative
and executive acts, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless can be categorized with the
courts espousing the rule enactment standard because the Ninth Circuit's
method of distinguishing between legislative and executive acts developed out
of and is still in keeping with this standard. For a discussion of how the Ninth
Circuit's version of the rule enactment standard developed, see infra notes 28494 and accompanying text.
283. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679 (quoting Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580).
284. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). For the Ninth Circuit decision that utilized the
Yakus statement, see Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580 (quoting Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424).
Yakus was a criminal case involving neither land use issues nor § 1983. See
Yakus, 321 U.S. at 418. The petitioners in Yakus were convicted of violating the
Emergency Price Control Act, as amended by the Inflation Control Act of October 2, 1942, by willfully selling cuts of beef wholesale at prices exceeding the
maximum prices set by a regulation of the Act. Id. The Act was promulgated as
a temporary wartime measure. Id. at 419. The issues before the Court were: (1)
whether Congress, through the Act, unconstitutionally delegated its legislative
power to the Price Administrator; (2) whether challenging the validity of the
maximum price regulation was a valid defense in a criminal prosecution under
the Act; (3) whether the procedure of judicial review of regulations provided
adequate due process; and (4) whether a provision of the Act violated the Sixth
Amendment if challenging the validity of the maximum price regulation was not
deemed a valid defense. Id. at 418. In response to the first issue, the Court held
that Congress acted within its legislative power in promulgating the Act. Id. at
423. In support of its holding, the Court described the "essentials of the legislative function." Id. at 424. For the Court's statement as to what comprised the
legislative function, see infra text accompanying note 285.
285. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424.
286. See Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580 (finding that "[a]dministration of a contract does not involve the formulation of policy 'as a defined and binding rule of
conduct' " and is therefore an executive function). This distinction between determining legislative policy and formulating policy into a rule of conduct may be
an important one. If the only inquiry necessary to determine whether an official
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Previously, the Ninth Circuit in Cinevision had used the phrase "ad
hoc decision-making" instead of the term "enforcement" in stating its
standard for determining what constitutes an executive act. 2 87 The term
"ad hoc" means "for this special purpose.12 8 8 From this definition, it
follows that "ad hoc decision-making" occurs when the decision-maker
resolves the particular issue that is presented before him or her at that
particular time. In cases prior to Zamsky, it was uncertain whether ad hoc
decision-making was the standard used to characterize executive action,
or whether it was just one characteristic of executive action. 28 9 The
Ninth Circuit held until the Zamsky decision that an executive function
encompassed monitoring compliance with established laws and institut29 0
ing an action against specific individuals to enforce laws.
Under the Zamsky decision, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit has expanded the rule enactment test by adopting "ad hoc decision-making"
29 1
as the standard for determining what constitutes an executive act.
The Zamsky majority expanded the Cinevision definition of "ad hoc decision-making" to include monitoring compliance of potential law with established law and making recommendations as to how compliance may
be achieved. 29 2 Thus, in contrast to the three elements that constitute
act is legislative was whether the official was making a determination on legislative policy, then discretionary decisions that are directed at specified individuals,
such as denying a request for a zoning variance to a landowner, could be considered legislative, even though they would traditionally be considered administrative. See Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 693 n.60 (3d Cir. 1980)
(noting that denial of variance would be example of administrative act), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Dunmore v. City of Natchez, 703 F. Supp. 31, 32
(S.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that denying request for zoning variance is legislative
act affording defendant officials legislative immunity).
287. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580. In Cinevision, the Ninth Circuit began with
the proposition that the enforcement of general zoning laws is an executive act
and concluded that executive functions are those involving ad hoc decision-making. Id. at 578, 580. Therefore, under this view, it is unclear as to whether ad
hoc decision-making or enforcing laws is the standard by which an act should be

characterized.
288. BLAcK's

LAW DICTIONARY

41 (6th ed. 1990).

289. See Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 579 (holding that monitoring and administering contract "would generally seem to be an executive function"); Kuzinich v.
County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that executive function involves ordering County Counsel to bring action against specific
individual to enforce general zoning ordinance).
290. For an explanation as to why it was unclear in Cinevision whether the ad
hoc decision-making concept was the basis for its holding, see supra note 287.
291. See Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679 (supporting its conclusion that monitoring

compliance with established zoning laws is executive function, reasoning that
such monitoring "involv[es] 'ad hoc decisionmaking' rather than 'formulation of

policy' ").
292. Id. at 679. In Cinevision, only monitoring compliance of a municipal
contract was considered an "ad hoc" executive act. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 579.
The act of making recommendations as to how to comply with a zoning law was
not characterized prior to Zamsky by the Ninth Circuit.
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an executive act under the "traditional" rule enactment standard, 2 93 the
Ninth Circuit's broadened application of "ad hoc decision-making" in
Zamsky suggests that for an act to be characterized as executive, it must
meet only two requirements: first, the officials must have made a decision pursuant to established law and second, their decision must have
2 94
been applied to specific individuals.
B.

Interpretation of the Ninth Circuit's CharacterizationStandard
by the Dissent

Despite the Zamsky majority's use of the basic tenets of the rule enactment standard, the dissent disagreed with the majority's expanded
application of the standard. In fact, the dissent stated that the majority's
opinion had effectively reversed prior precedent. 29 5 The dissent argued
that the majority had erred in accepting Zamsky's argument that the
LCDC officials' act was executive because the act was directed specifically at him. 29 6 This contention by the dissent, however, is misplaced.
The concept of enforcement, upheld and further refined by the Ninth
Circuit in Cinevision,29 7 necessarily involves the application of policy to
specific persons. The majority's acceptance of Zamsky's argument,
293. For a description of the "traditional" rule enactment standard, see
supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
294. See Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679.
295. Id. at 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) ("This error [in mischaracterizing
the LCDC's continuance order as being an executive act] has led the majority to
conclude that our decision in Cinevision compels reversal.").
296. Id. at 686 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). The dissent accused the majority
of applying the previously rejected general scope standard. See id. at 686-87
(Alarcon, J., dissenting) ("We declined . .. [in Cinevision] to adopt the rule suggested by Zamsky . . . that would define an executive act as 'an act directed at
one or a few individuals.' "). The dissent interpreted Cinevision to define legislative acts as acts that formulate legislative policy or "promulgat[e] a rule of conduct with general application." Id. at 686 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). The dissent,
however, was inconsistent in defining the rule. On the one hand, the dissent
stated that promulgating a rule of conduct with general application is a legislative act. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). On the other hand, the dissent stated that
a rule defining an executive act as an act that is directed at one or a few individuals is not the applicable rule. Id. at 686-87 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
What Zamsky did allege in his complaint was that the officials' act was " 'an
action against a specific individual enforcing the general zoning ordinance.' "
Id. at 679. An action "taken against" an individual is not the same as an action
"directed at" an individual. The former situation suggests that persons were
enforcing a law. The latter situation suggests both that persons were enforcing
a law and that the law itself includes a reference to a specific individual. The
latter situation was rejected in Cinevision because it focuses on the scope of an
act, thereby improperly widening the reach of what constitutes an executive act.
See Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 579 n.26.
297. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 577-78 (noting that Ninth Circuit has held that
in "ordering the County Counsel to institute an action against a specific individual enforcing the general ordinance, the local legislature ... [was] act[ing] in an
executive, rather than a legislative, capacity" (citing Kuzinich v. County of Santa
Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982))).
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therefore, is not tantamount to a reversal of Cinevision or an espousal of a
previously rejected standard. Instead, what the majority accomplished
in Zamsky was to expand the characteristics of executive acts, thereby
concurrently limiting the characteristics of legislative acts.
The dissent's argument is based on the premise that because the
LCDC officials were acting within their power as mandated by Oregon's
statutory code, they were acting in a legislative capacity. 29 8 The dissent
argued that the issuance of a continuance order is "akin" to an exercise
of executive veto power. 29 9 Because exercise of the veto power prevents a policy determination from becoming law, it has been held to be a
legislative act.3 00 Under Oregon's statutory code, however, denial of a
comprehensive plan is not labelled as equivalent to exercise of the veto
power. 30 ' While the majority did not extensively address the issue of
how the LCDC's denial power should be characterized, the majority did
comment that had the LCDC denied Klamath County's comprehensive
plan, that act possibly would have been legislative.3 0 2 Whether the
LCDC's denial power is a legislative act under the dissent's view or possibly a legislative act under the majority's view depends upon how the
mechanics of this power are discerned.
Under Oregon's comprehensive plan system, the denial of a local
plan is effectively a denial of local policy in favor of a policy determination previously set by the LCDC in its statewide goals. 30 3 In one sense,
if the LCDC were to deny a local plan, it would be a legislative act because it is a policy determination to dismiss the policy-based local plan;
it would not simply be an ad hoc determination as to which components
of the plan complied with the state plan and which did not. In another
sense, the act of denying a local plan could be considered an executive
298. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 685 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) ("[T]he LCDC function in granting acknowledgement or in preventing a zoning ordinance from
having any legal effect is a mandatory part of its legislative function under Oregon law.").
299. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
300. See Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 490 (1932). See generally
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1164-65 (6th ed. 1990) (veto is refusal of assent by
executive officer of law passed by legislative body). Arguably, in Zamsky, the
LCDC's refusal to acknowledge Klamath County's local plan could be administrative even under the legislative process standard. For an explanation of the

legislative process standard, see supra notes 225-39 and accompanying text. The
dissent reasoned that because the statutorily promulgated act of "acknowledging" a local plan is equivalent to an enactment, the opposite act, refusal, must
also be part of the legislative process. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 685 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). It does not necessarily follow, however, that the refusal to acknowl-

edge a local plan is equivalent to a veto.
301. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.251(1) (1989) (referring to act of refusing to
give local land use plan force of law as denial order).
302. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 679 ("[T]he LCDC ... has a role which might be
considered legislative-confirming local plans and thereby giving them the force
of law .... ").
303. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.251(1) (1989).
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act because it involves a determination of whether the local plan conforms to the previously established statewide goals. The latter situation,
however, does not follow from the meaning of "ad hoc decision-making." Indeed, the decision to deny a local comprehensive plan is itself a
policy decision to deny the policies embodied by the local plan; it is not
a decision to penetrate through the policy of the plan to make determinations on its specifics. It therefore follows that the denial power of the
LCDC should be characterized as a legislative act, as the dissent concluded.3 0 4 If the majority's holding were strictly applied, however, an
official's exercise of the denial power would constitute the monitoring of
compliance of local plans with statewide goals and would thus be an
3
executive act.

05

Furthermore, in issuing the continuance order, the LCDC acknowl306
edged some parts of the plan and denied other parts of the plan.
Under the dissent's argument, this should be a legislative act.3 0 7 Making recommendations under the dissent's view should also be a legislative act because it was part of the legislative process, just like a denial or
an acknowledgment of the plan.3 0 8 On this point, the dissent's reasoning is inaccurate. Making recommendations under the traditional definition of enforcement would not be an executive act because it was not
binding on the county. That is, the recommendations would be a legislative act not because the act was part of the legislative process, as the
dissent argued, but because the recommendations made by the LCDC
were simply a guide for the county.
C.

Zamsky v. Hansell Analyzed Under the
TraditionalRule Enactment Standard

After Zamsky, application of the enactment prong of the Ninth Circuit's rule enactment standard is uncertain. To the majority, the LCDC
officials' act of "formulating policy" seemingly was completed after they
promulgated the statewide land use goals, and it would not be until they
actually acknowledged a local plan that they would again be engaged in
the formulation of policy. In effect, the majority focused on the basis of
the act and not on its substance. The majority seemed to reason that all
of the land use policy that was to be formulated had already been formulated in the statewide goals. The majority did not consider, however,
304. See Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
305. On the other hand, perhaps the crux of the holding in Zamsky is not
based on the fact that the LCDC officials were "monitoring compliance" of local
land use plans with the statewide goals, but instead is based on the fact that the
LCDC officials singled out Zamsky's land when making recommendations to
Klamath County on how compliance may be achieved. If this is so, then it is
difficult to say how far the holding extends past the facts of the case.
306. Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 678.
307. Id. at 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
308. See id. at 685, 687 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
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that while the statewide goals operate as the law in the absence of local
law, 30 9 once enacted, local law becomes the source of law for the
county. 31 ° Thus, the LCDC is empowered to enact laws on two
"levels:" on the local level and on the state level. While the laws on
both levels should be the same, two separate acts are necessary before
the laws are enacted. Therefore, the majority should have considered
the LCDC's act regarding the local plan as distinct from the act regarding the statewide goals, even though the law promulgated on the state
level was the basis for the law promulgated on the local level. If the
majority had viewed the Oregon comprehensive plan system in this
light, it would also have characterized the LCDC's act of issuing the continuance order as a legislative act.
Moreover, had the "enactment" and "enforcement" prongs of the
traditional rule enactment standard been applied in Zamsky, 3 11 the
LCDC officials' acts would also have been characterized as legislative.
Under a traditional enactment analysis 3 t 2 of the LCDC officials' issuance of a continuance order for Klamath County's comprehensive plan:
the LCDC officials were formulating policy by acknowledging some
parts of the plan and denying other parts of the plan; the policy embodied in the local plan was of general applicability within the county; and
the acknowledgement and denial of the plan was binding on the county,
and, therefore, on all persons within the county. Thus, the LCDC Commissioners' issuance of the continuance order met all of the requirements of an enactment. Under the enactment analysis for the
recommendations given by the LCDC officials, the recommendations,
while based on the policy-made statewide goals, were not a formulation
of policy; the recommendations were of specific applicability to particular landowners; and the recommendations were not binding on either
the county or the individual landowners. As is evident from this analysis, the LCDC's act of making recommendations for compliance did not
meet the requirements of a legislative act under the enactment prong of
the rule enactment standard.
Under a traditional enforcement analysis3 1 3 of the rule enactment
standard for the LCDC officials' denial of portions of Klamath County's
plan: (1) the LCDC officials did not address the decision to deny the
plan to specific individuals; (2) the decision was made pursuant to an
established law-the statewide goals; but (3) the decision did not force
an individual to comply and instead forced the entire county to comply.
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.251 (1989).
310. Id. §§ 197.175(1), (2)(c) (1989).
311. For a discussion of the rule enactment standard as traditionally applied, see supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
312. For a discussion of the enactment analysis, see supra notes 118-21 and
accompanying text.
313. For a discussion of the enforcement analysis, see supra notes 122-26
and accompanying text.

309.
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Thus, the officials' action of issuing the continuance order did not meet
the requirements of an enforcement and cannot be regarded as an executive act. Under the enforcement analysis as to the LCDC officials' recommendations on how compliance might be achieved: (1) the LCDC
officials made recommendations that were directed at specific individuals; (2) the recommendations were made pursuant to established law
(the goals); but (3) the recommendations were not binding on Zamsky
or the county. Thus, under the enactment prong of the test, the LCDC
officials' recommendations did not reflect an executive act. As is evident
after the two prongs of the rule enactment standard are applied, the
LCDC officials' continuance order was made in a legislative capacity and
not in an executive capacity. The act of making the recommendations
was neither legislative nor executive-it should not have been a part of
the dispute at all.
Thus, the Zamsky majority seems to have extended its definition of
ad hoc decision-making to such an extent that it has limited what constitutes a legislative act. In this case, the LCDC's act should have been
labelled as legislative because the LCDC officials, though monitoring a
new plan against established statewide goals, were monitoring policy
against policy, thereby making their entire decision a policy decision.
The majority's extension of the general meaning of enforcement31 to
include monitoring policy against policy and making recommendations
not binding on any specific individual was therefore unwarranted.
V.

CONCLUSION

Zamsky, in both its majority and dissenting opinions, reflects the difficulty courts encounter in attempting to characterize land use decisions.
Of the six characterization standards used in federal court decisions, the
rule enactment standard seems to best characterize official acts. This
conclusion is apparent because only the rule enactment standard identifies legislative and administrative functions with common labels-"enactment" and "enforcement"-that dovetail the purposes of affording
3 15
government officials section 1983 immunity.
The rule enactment standard nevertheless requires further clarification. A federal court faced with a section 1983 immunity issue should
make two inquiries to decide whether an official act is an "enactment" or
an "enforcement" of law. First, a court should investigate whether: (1)
the officials were formulating or rejecting proposed policy; (2) the decision generally applied to all persons within the community; and (3) the
decision was a binding rule of conduct. If all three elements are present,
the officials have acted in a legislative capacity and should thus receive
314. For the general meaning of enforcement, see supra notes 116 & 122-26
and accompanying text.
315. For a discussion of the purposes of affording officials § 1983 immunity, see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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absolute immunity. It is not enough for the officials to have based a decision on policy; policy itself must have been formulated or rejected by the
decision. Second, a court should determine whether: (1) the officials
have made a decision that was directed at or applied to specific individuals in the community; (2) the decision was based on established rules of
conduct; and (3) the decision was binding on specific individuals and not
on the general populace. All three of these elements must be present
for officials to have acted in an administrative capacity and thus be entitled to receive qualified immunity. If such lines are drawn, then characterizing land use decisions will be simplified and landowners will be
better able to predict whether officials will have absolute or qualified
immunity from suit, thereby reducing unnecessary and expensive section 1983 litigation.
Marguerite N. Przybylski
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